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During the Cold War, the Arctic became a stage for the superpowers’ rivalry. The more ballistical 
armament was developed further, the more the Arctic armament increased. In the 1980s, the Arctic region 
was a region where the Cold War’s escalation was a real fear. Simultaneously the environmental questions 
started to concern more and more. Furthermore, although international agreements to protect nature had 
been negotiated and bilateral ones were being accelerated, there was no organisation for the Arctic dealing 
region as a whole. This lack of cooperation encountered with détente, the US and the Soviet Union’s 
leaders converged with rhetoric about restrictions on armaments. When Gorbachev gave a speech on 
October 1987 in Murmansk and longed for further cooperation in the Arctic region, a situation arose, 
which enabled the opening of cooperation negotiations. Eventually, Finland was the first to seize the 
moment, and this led to Finland’s initiative. The initiative aimed to arrange a Conference on the Protection 
of the Environment in Finland.  
  
This master’s thesis examines Finland’s Arctic diplomacy from September 1986 to October 1989, from 
The Reykjavík Summit to when the first meeting of Arctic issues with eight Arctic states was kept. More 
precisely, this thesis research how Finland was performing Arctic diplomacy during the period and if there 
were a change to Finland’s line after the Gorbachev’s speech. Hence, the thesis examines what type of 
reactions and consequences Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech affected in Finland’s foreign policy. 
Moreover, this thesis is interested in who was conducting nascent cooperation in the Arctic Region. The 
primary data used in this thesis are Finland’s Foreign Minister’s archives documents.  
 
The study shows that Finland’s Arctic diplomacy was at first in 1986, observative and reactional. However, 
after Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk, Finland took the lead and worked actively to start cooperation. In 
this role, Finland needed to act as a balancer between the Arctic countries’ boundary conditions. Especially 
the US was hesitating and by this stretched Finland’s negotiator skills. Eventually, Finland achieved in 
arranging a consultative meeting in Finland in September 1989. This meeting became to be the first of two 
preparative meetings before the actual ministerial conference. Notably, Finland gained the leading force 
and was mainly conducting cooperation during the years examined. Nevertheless, the Gorbachev’s speech 
had a high impact on the momentum, but, significantly, Finland was the one who succeeded seize the 
moment.  
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“The Soviet Union is in favour of a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation 
in the region. Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North 
Pole be a pole of peace. We suggest that all interested states start talks on the limitation 
and scaling down of military activity in the North as a whole, in both the Eastern and 
Western Hemispheres.”1  
    – Mikhail Gorbachev, 1987 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The Reykjavík Summit between the President of the United States (US) Ronald Reagan 
and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail 
Gorbachev in October 1986, one year before the Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk, can 
be seen as a breakthrough for the Arctic cooperation. At that time, the leaders of the 
world's two superpowers negotiated about the massive reduction of nuclear weapons in 
the era, where military-political tension and confrontation of superpowers were 
normality2. However, Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk was the actual turning point for 
the Arctic. Thus, the progress of the cooperation in the Arctic area can be seen started 
when the Soviet Union underwent severe internal political changes in the 1980s, from 
where the speech was also a result of.3 The speech was followed by a series of proposals 
for Arctic cooperation, where Finland was first to seize the moment at the beginning of 
19894. 
 
Before the events in Murmansk in 1987, most of the agreements dealing, way or another, 
the Arctic region were bilateral and concentrated only one or two issues, for example, 
trading or exploitation of natural resources. There was no organisation for the Arctic 
																																								 																				
1 Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987. 
[https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf] 
2 Heikkilä, Markku (2006) Pohjoinen ulottuvuus. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 
Europe Information 188/2006, 11–12. 
3 Lähteenmäki, Maria (2017) Footprints in the Snow. The Long History of Arctic Finland. The 
Prime Minister's Office: Prime Minister’s Office Publications 8/2017, 160. 
4 Heikkilä 2006, 12. 
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dealing region as a whole, and countries had not been in the same table negotiating issues 
concerning the Arctic region, even though many Arctic states had membership in other 
international organisations. 5  Similarly, agreements dealing the Arctic nature were 
fragmented, and the Arctic nature as an entity was not dealt in any agreements6. Hence, 
when Finland proposed the other Arctic states to arrange a conference on the protection 
of the Arctic environment in January 1989, the event was unparalleled. Ultimately, as a 
result of these events, in September 1989, officials from the eight Arctic countries met in 
Rovaniemi, Finland, to discuss collaborative means to save the Arctic environment. The 
conference established the process of Rovaniemi-declaration. Finland’s proposition and 
the meeting in Rovaniemi was followed by the Canadian Prime Minister's proposal for 
even more broader cooperation between the Arctic countries in late 1989. 7  As a 
conclusion, in Rovaniemi, states agreed to work towards a meeting of circumpolar 
Ministers responsible for the Arctic environmental issues8. Thus, negotiations established 
by Finland can be seen as very proactive. For one instance more, when acting, the 
European Community was not interested in the Arctic area. Only when Finland and 
Sweden joined the European Union, areas behind the Arctic Circle came to discussion.9 
Besides, the turn of the 1980s and 1990s meant a change from traditional security to wider 
security, where, for instance, environmental issues matters as well as military issues10. 
 
Climate change and globalisation extend to all parts of the world, and the Arctic area does 
not make an exception to these facts. Arctic nature is more vulnerable than other parts of 
the world, and the melting sea ice is affecting the whole world. Economic opportunities 
are growing when the polar ice is melting. The northern part of the world has a significant 
amount of different kinds of natural resources, and due to mineral resources, mining is 
																																								 																				
5 Archer, Clive (1990) Arctic Cooperation: A Nordic Model. An article in Bulletin of Peace 
Proposals 1990 Jun, Vol.21(2), 168. 
6 Heininen, Lassi (1991) Sotilaallisen läsnäolon ympäristöriskit Arktiksessa. Kohti Arktiksen 
säätelyjärjestelmiä. Licentiate thesis. Tampere Peace Research Institute. Research No. 43. 1991, 
Tampere, 171. 
7 Lähteenmäki 2017, 160–161; Heikkilä, Markku (1998) Arktiset visiot. Pohjoinen, Oulu, 66–
67. 
8 Heikkilä 1998, 67–68.  
9 Lähteenmäki 2017, 161–162. 
10 Heininen, Lassi (2011) Arktisen alueen muuttuva geopolitiikka ja valtioiden arktiset/pohjoiset 
strategiat ja politiikat. An article in Heininen, Lassi & Palosaari Teemu (ed.): Jäitä poltellessa. 
Suomi ja Arktisen alueen tulevaisuus. Tutkimuksia/Tapri. No 97, 2011. Tampere University 
Press, Tampere, 38.	
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common. At the bottom of the Arctic Sea lies a massive amount of oil and gas reserves, 
and climate change enables the use of these valuable resources. Moreover, sea ice dodges 
year after year more, making new routes for ships possible.11 Thus, these facts mean that 
the cooperation in Arctic issues started in the late 1980s is needed even more now. In 
2009, the University of Lapland arranged a first expert seminar on Policy and Security 
Research on Arctic Issues. In the seminar, Docent Lassi Heininen argued in a press release 
that Arctic areas were confronting with new geopolitical, geoeconomic, and 
environmental situations. This rapid change needed analysis, new indicators, and, above 
all, new academic research on spheres of politics and security. Furthermore, Lassi 
Heininen & Teemu Palosaari concluded that as an Arctic state, Finland has its 
responsibility to do actively scientific research on Arctic issues. This thesis responds to 
these challenges posed by adding information about the starting points of Arctic 
cooperation.12 
 
Furthermore, the topic is worth studying, at least, because of three reasons. Firstly, the 
history of Arctic cooperation has been researched as a widespread phenomenon, and the 
literature from this point is comprehensive. Former Prime Minister of Finland announced 
the importance of the ‘Northern Dimension’ in the late 1990s, and that triggered research 
as well – prevailing political conditions raises topics for research13. However, there is no 
research on Finland’s Arctic diplomacy during 1986-1989; Finland’s Foreign Minister’s 
archives have only recently opened due to the 25 years encryption rule.  Thus, this thesis 
will bring new knowledge about the early years of Finland’s Arctic Diplomacy when most 
of the research has been timed to years after 1990. 
 
																																								 																				
11 Numminen, Lotta (2011) Arktisen alueen muuttuva kansainvälinen yhteistyö. An article in 
Heininen, Lassi & Palosaari Teemu (ed.): Jäitä poltellessa. Suomi ja Arktisen alueen 
tulevaisuus. Tutkimuksia/Tapri. No 97, 2011. Tampere University Press, Tampere, 15–16. 
12 Heininen, L. & Palosaari, T. (2011). Johdanto. An article in Heininen, Lassi & Palosaari 
Teemu (ed.): Jäitä poltellessa. Suomi ja Arktisen alueen tulevaisuus. Tutkimuksia/Tapri. No 97, 
2011. Tampere University Press, Tampere, 9; University of Lapland. 29.9.2009. Pohjoisen 
politiikan ja turvallisuuden tutkimuksen seminaari. [https://www.ulapland.fi/news/Pohjoisen-
politiikan-ja-turvallisuuden-tutkimuksen-seminaari/mahebd4d/0d2e8f1b-f44a-4832-a607-
20e29844acbc]  
13 Lähteenmäki, Maria (2007) Introduction: The Revival of Regional History. An article in 
Maria Lähteenmäki (ed.) The Flexible Frontier: Change and Continuity in Finnish-Russian 
Relations. Aleksanteri Series 5/2007. University of Helsinki, 16. 
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Secondly, the diplomacy between Finland and Russia has been, for centuries, a unique 
case. Therefore, Finland’s enthusiasm for the Arctic and Russia’s undisputed superpower 
status in the Arctic region is a fascinating combination to research in the years before the 
Rovaniemi declaration and the establishment of the Arctic Council. Finland’s role as a 
balancer has not been researched during the early years of the process of the Arctic 
cooperation in the late 1980s.  
 
Thirdly, the general question in Arctic regional studies has been whether the Arctic has 
an identity to be an internationally relevant region14. This question popped up the late 
1980s and during the 1990s, amid the rapid rise of the cooperation organs. After this 
research dilemma, social sciences research of the Arctic cooperation accelerated. 
Therefore, one might say that this thesis deals with a fundamental base of the Arctic 
dilemma when reviewing the collaborative period of the late 1980s. As a result of this, it 
might even be argued that this thesis deals with the origins of Arctic research in the field 
of social sciences. 
 
 
1.2 The Arctic and the Arctic Eight 
 
The Arctic area’s definition varies. The boundary is considered to be north of the Arctic 
Circle (66° 33’N), where Finland has the Finnish Arctic region, which consists of the 
northern part of the Province of Lapland above the Arctic Circle.15 Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP) of the Arctic Council defines the Arctic area with 
multiple meters, and Finland meets most of the criteria16. Nevertheless, Finland is one of 
the northernmost countries in the world, even though the country is lacking the Arctic 
Ocean seashore, which Finland lost in the Continuation War to the Soviet Union. Finland 
has a large population in Lapland, which partially consists of the indigenous Saḿi people. 
After the rapid out-migration from Lapland to Southern-Finland in the 1960s, Finland 
																																								 																				
14 Tennberg, Monica (1998) The Arctic Council. A Study in Governmentality. Acta Universitatis 
Lapponiensis 19. University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 15. 
15 Arctic Centre (2017) Arctic Region. 
[http://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/communications/arcticregion]  
16 AMAP (2009) Definitions of the Arctic region. 
[https://www.amap.no/documents/download/432]  
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established four universities in northern Finland.17 This northern education has been, and 
it is still today, highly considered, and, for example, Arctic Council admits that Finland 
has much Arctic-related expertise to offer to the regional cooperation18. From the 1980s 
to the 1990s, the Arctic direction can be clearly found from Finland’s foreign policy. In 
that era, the northern dimension in foreign policy never formed into a clear strategy; 
instead, it was involved in many different policy sectors. 19  Eventually, Finland’s 
government announced its first Arctic Strategy in 2010, and all political parties were 
involved in the preparation. The process of the strategy revealed that the growing 
significance of the Arctic region was understood over party boundaries.20 
 
Even though the Arctic is nowadays quite merely defined as an area which is northern 
from the Arctic Circle, defining was not clear when the negotiations in the 1980s started. 
Since there was no transparent definition for the Arctic, the project of cooperation in the 
Arctic area had, as well, been a question of a creating regime. During the Cold War, the 
Arctic was mostly the playground for two superpowers, not an area for multiple 
countries.21 The Arctic states -concept rose to a discussion in the 1970s, then discussion 
included for the Arctic states only five rim-countries with Arctic Ocean shoreline 22. The 
Arctic Rim –countries were the US, Canada, the Soviet Union, Norway, Iceland, and 
Denmark due to Greenland’s shore23. This eventually changed in the 1980s, and the 
concept of ‘the Arctic Eight’ developed quite soon after Gorbachev’s speech in 
Murmansk 1987. Then Gorbachev drew the Arctic area in his speech more south than it 
usually had been thought, even though he did not mention any exact list of Arctic 
																																								 																				
17 Lähteenmäki 2017, 88 & 99–100. 
18 Arctic Council (2015) Member States. 
 [https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states]  
19 Heininen, Lassi (1999) Euroopan pohjoinen 1990-luvulla. Moniulotteisten ja ristiriitaisten 
intressien alue. Doctoral thesis. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 21. Arctic Centre Reports 30. 
University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 304. 
20 Halinen, Heikki (2011) Esipuhe. An article in Heininen, Lassi & Palosaari Teemu (ed.): Jäitä 
poltellessa. Suomi ja Arktisen alueen tulevaisuus. Tutkimuksia/Tapri. No 97, 2011. Tampere 
University Press, Tampere, 8. 
21 Young, Oran R. (1998) Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance. 
Cornell  
University Press, New York, vii. 
22 Keskitalo, E. C. H. (2004) Negotiating the Arctic. The Construction of an International 
Region. Routledge, New York, 45–46. 
23 Rotkirch, Holger. 14.9.1987. Etelämannerta ja napa-alueita koskevien kysymysten käsittely 
ulkoasiainministeriössä. Memo 90. Signum 13.40 Arktiset alueet (FIN-AMFA 13.40-1), 3. 
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countries. The only country he mentioned in as an Arctic context was, in fact, Finland. 24 
However, he did repeatedly mentioned seven countries in his speech, the US, Canada, 
Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway25 . Moreover, after the Murmansk 
momentum in 1987, all countries being before actively interested in Arctic issues, for 
example, in scientific cooperation, were included. Thus, the concept ‘Arctic Eight’ was 
developed, which included all the countries mentioned in Gorbachev's speech.26 They all 
are countries having land up north from the Arctic Circle, as well.  
 
 
1.3 Previous Research 
 
Lassi Heininen has written numerous articles and other works about arctic cooperation, 
and his doctoral dissertation in 1999 “Euroopan pohjoinen 1990-luvulla – 
Moniulotteisten ja ristiriitaisten intressien alue 27” was also from this theme. In his 
doctoral dissertation, Heininen analysed the region of the European North in general, as 
well as, from the point of Finland and Norway's view. Heininen analysed the new Era in 
Europe, from the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued to the late 1990s. He 
concentrated on the transition, in where the whole international political system was in 
change after the situation in Russia, but his dissertation examined this transition in the 
Arctic areas. Heininen asked in his dissertation “What kind of a region in the European 
North: Is it still a geostrategically important security area from the point of view of the 
superpowers --?” Heininen concludes that the region was in the late 1990s still in 
transition: many cooperation projects had been established, but those were still a very 
early stage. However, cooperation organs, for instance, the BEAR, were still in operation, 
and to some extent, those were ruling the international policies in the Arctic. In addition 
to multinational cooperation, smaller scale, regional cooperations started to emerge. 
Finally, Heininen summed up that the situation in the North had been changed totally 
from the years of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the area was not yet a regionalised global 
region and was struggling under the external, for example, economic pressures.28 
																																								 																				
24 Keskitalo 2004, 45–46. 
25 Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987. 
26 Keskitalo 2004, 45–46. 
27 In English, The European North in the 1990s – A Region of Multifunctional and Conflicting 
Interests. 
28 Heininen 1999, 373–407. 
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As mentioned before, research of the Arctic cooperation has concentrated on the time 
after the Soviet Union collapsion in 1991, there is one doctoral dissertation covering the 
period of the late 1980s as well. Carina Keskitalo’s doctoral dissertation “Constructing 
´the Arctic´ – Discourses of international region-building” in 2002 has examined 
organisational developments from the late 1970s to the early 1990s and the development 
of environment-based cooperation which eventually led to the establishment of the Arctic 
Council. Keskitalo concluded that Arctic discourse is a complex mixture of natural and 
social relations of the environment, and in the Arctic region’s discourse, the environment 
and both indigenous and traditional entities are critical. However, according to Keskitalo, 
the human-made constructed region “the Arctic” was an illusion, and the Arctic would 
not have been able to be defined as a homogenous region. Keskitalo ended his dissertation 
on the observation that, while the Arctic cooperation has all the way from the outset been 
focused on protecting the environment, the homogeneous thinking of the Arctic region 
does not recognise the distinct needs and problems of the Arctic and the uniqueness of its 
individual components. Therefore, multiple Arctic cooperation projects in the field of 
environmental protection may not succeed in goals made. Besides, the strict border what 
the Arctic is and what is not, closes the rest of the world out. Furthermore, since the 
problems outside the Arctic also have consequences for the North, the environmental 
protection cooperation in the Arctic has even worse possibilities to succeed.29 Keskitalo's 
doctoral dissertation is done at the University of Lapland, where research on the Arctic 
Council related issues are prevalent and widely used in this thesis as well.   
 
In turn, Sinevaara-Niskanen Heidi has researched in her doctoral thesis “Setting the Stage 
for Arctic Development. Politics of Knowledge and the Power of Presence” in 2015, the 
usage of politics of knowledge in the Arctic Council, as well as how different agendas 
and agents are becoming present in Arctic politics. Although the dissertation is done 
under Social Sciences, it is very much relating to Gender Studies instead of political 
history.30 
																																								 																				
29 Keskitalo, E. Carina H. (2002) Constructing ‘the Arctic’ Discourses of international region-
building. Doctoral thesis. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 47. University of Lapland, 
Rovaniemi, Abstract. 
30 Sinevaara-Niskanen, Heidi (2015) Setting the Stage for Arctic Development. Politics of 
Knowledge and the Power of Presence. Doctoral thesis. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 304. 
University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Abstract. 
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The last doctoral dissertation from the University of Lapland mentioned here is Monica 
Tennberg’s “The Arctic Council. A Study in Governmentality”. In her dissertation, 
Tennberg answered to problem what is the meaning of the Arctic cooperation, especially 
in the Arctic Council. She reviewed the theme through the discourse of sovereignty, 
knowledge, and development. The researched period was from the late 1980s to the end 
of the 1990s. To this thesis, Tennberg’s dissertation provides points of contact when 
dealing discourses from the end of the 1980s and when dealing with the question of 
power, in other words, who had the power to conduct the Arctic cooperation. Tennberg 
argued through Michel Foucault’s definition of the exercise of power, where power in 
action means to conduct others. Who was conducting, had the power as well, and then 
power did not have any formal and written rules; in this, the exercise of power consists 
in directing opportunities for action and arranging for a possible outcome. Moreover, 
Tennberg argued that Foucault’s idea of that who can seize momentum, replace, and take 
authority from previously prevailing actors and redirect them to the desired way has the 
means to change prevailing order successfully.31  
 
Researcher Teemu Palosaari from The Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) has 
many publications related to Arctic issues. In 2012, he published an article in Nordia 
Geographical Publications “The amazing race. On resources, conflict, and cooperation 
in the Arctic”. Even though he admits that the Arctic cooperation began in the late 1980s 
and that Finland was a crucial part of it, he concentrated on the time after the Cold War.32 
 
With a regional theme of cooperation in the North, in Laura Arho’s masters’ thesis 
“Barentsin euroarktinen alue (BEAR): alueellinen yhteistyö ydinturvallisuuden 
parantamiseksi” regionalism and cooperation has been examined through the Barent’s 
Euro-Arctic Region, which is a region made for to discuss its regional issues. 
Furthermore, Region has a council, The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), which is 
the forum for intergovernmental cooperation on issues concerning the Barents region. 
Arho’s thesis dealt with international cooperation to improve nuclear safety in the region, 
and the main objective of the study was to find out what had been done to improve nuclear 
																																								 																				
31 Tennberg 1998, 21, 55, 84 & 90–93. 
32 Palosaari, Teemu (2011) The amazing race. On resources, conflict, and cooperation in the 
Arctic. Nordia Geographical Publications, 40(4), pp. 13-30. 
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safety in the area. The thesis concluded that the co-operation in the region had been 
efficient with low-policy areas. However, high politics related to security issues had been 
excluded from cooperation. Since the BEAR was established in 1993, Arho’s thesis dealt 
with regionalism and cooperation in the post-Cold War era.33 
 
Jasmin Repo focused on her master thesis on the views expressed by political decision-
makers on Finland's arcticness. The thesis used a critical geopolitical view of geography 
as a political and socially produced concept and applied this to the conception of Finland’s 
arcticness. The material Repo used revealed that the geopolitical construction of Finland's 
arcticness was based on four types of understanding: Finland's geographical position as 
an Arctic country, Finland's special expertise, Finland's participation in the creation of 
institutions in the region, and Arctic characteristics based on Finnish history and culture. 
In particular, the political and cultural definitions were the most clearly conceive of 
Finland as an Arctic country. Furthermore, Repo found out that Finland’s arcticness had 
been a generally accepted political structure among decision-makers, although the content 
of Arctic politics itself had sometimes divided.34 
 
In master thesis, Johanna Räty examined how Finland reacted to the Soviet plans to 
transfer all its nuclear tests to the Novaja Zemlya experimental area near Finland and to 
the nuclear test conducted in the area in October 1990. The central question was how 
Finland sought to influence the Soviet Union. The following question was how Finland 
tried to affect the Soviet Union’s politics even though the issue was strongly related to 
the interests of the great powers. Räty sought answers to what kind of perceptions formed 
the basis of Finnish politics. The purpose was to find out how Finland's foreign policy 
and its practical implementation changed in the later years of the Cold War and after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, used material showed that the issue of Novaja 
Zemlia's nuclear test was raised by Nordic co-operation with the initiative of Finland: 
Finland proposed a common position to the Nordic countries and actively contributed to 
the development of a standard Nordic policy. The Nordic statements emphasised the 
danger posed by nuclear testing to the vulnerable Arctic environment, even though 
																																								 																				
33 Barents Euro-Arctic Council official website 2019. About Us. Cooperation in the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Region. [https://www.barentscooperation.org/en/About] 
34 Repo, Jasmin (2015) Suomen arktisuus geopoliittisena konstruktiona. Master’s Thesis. The 
University of Helsinki. Abstract. 
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experts in the field considered nuclear testing to be of low risk. By emphasising the 
environmental safety of nuclear testing thus appears to be a deliberately chosen approach 
that avoided addressing the security policy issues that were inevitably linked to nuclear 
testing. Typical abstentions in Finland's neutrality policy were manifested, for example, 
in the attempt to avoid strong statements on the nuclear test ban, which were known to 
irritate both the United States and the Soviet Union. Illustratively, the United States, in 
particular, sought approval for Finland's activism.35 
 
Professor Oran R. Young has written a comprehensive number of publications about 
institutional and international governance and environmental institutions. He has written 
a lot about Arctic cooperation, as well. His work “Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and 
International Governance” concentrate on the cooperation in the Arctic region from the 
1980s to the late 1990s. He summed up that successful regime formation consists of three 
stages: successful agenda formation, successful negotiation, and finally, successful 
operationalization. Young describes that in the late eighties, Finland was, among others, 
one of the most remarkable negotiators in the Arctic issues.36   
 
 
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 
This master’s thesis aims to find out Finland’s Arctic diplomacy at the end of the Cold 
War. Furthermore, this thesis examines what type of reactions and consequences 
Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech affected in Finland’s foreign policy. The thesis analyses 
the situation before the speech and the reactions afterward, and the time frame is from 
September 1986 to October 1989, from The Reykjavík Summit to when the first meeting 
of Arctic issues with eight Arctic states was kept. Thus, this thesis is focusing on the path 
of Arctic cooperation during these significant years. From this period, this thesis will try 
to find out what Finland tried to say and achieve with the proactive line in Arctic 
cooperation, and how was the setting behind the public scenes? Along with these 
questions, the thesis investigates how Arctic policy was made in the Finland’s Foreign 
																																								 																				
35 Räty, Johanna (2018) ”Suurvaltojen valitseman turvallisuuspolitiikan keskeisiin ainesosiin 
pienillä mailla ei ole mahdollisuuksia vaikuttaa” – Novaja Zemljan ydinkokeet Suomen 
ulkopolitiikassa 1990–1993. Master’s Thesis. The University of Helsinki. Abstract. 
36 Young 1998, 35–62 and 168–170. 
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Ministry. This particular speech of Gorbachev’s was selected because it has been seen as 
the icebreaker for deeper and multi-governmental cooperation. The point of view is 
Finnish throughout the thesis, due to the fact that all sources are about Finland’s foreign 
policy. Since the thesis also examines the last years of the Cold War, how the Cold War 
scene influenced Finland’s Arctic policy is studied. Hence, this thesis is in the field of 
political history and, more specifically, the thesis examines the history of the Cold War. 
 
This thesis, thus, differs from the previous research mainly by timescape and from the 
point of view. Even though Keskitalo’s dissertation dealt with similar themes with this 
thesis, the angle to events was different; Keskitalo reviewed cooperation as a broad, 
international phenomenon and through discourse analysis, and this thesis is concentrating 
on Finland’s point of view and the actions what Finland made as an Arctic state. What 
comes to Heininen’s dissertation, it examined, as well, a different period than this thesis. 
Furthermore, Tennberg’s question of power and conducting is very intriguing and gives 
an interesting perspective to this thesis: who led the nascent collaboration in the desired 
direction in late 1980?  
 
The main research question of this thesis is 
 
- How was Finland performing Arctic diplomacy during the years 1986 – 1989? 
 
Furthermore, the two clarifying questions are the following:  
 
- How did the Finland’s Foreign Service relate and act to the Arctic issues before 
the Murmansk Momentum, from September 1986 to October 1987, and did this 
line change after Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk October 1987?  
 
- Based on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland’s Archive, who was 
conducting the Arctic cooperation? 
 
This thesis hypothesises that the internal changes in the Soviet Union, for example, 
glasnost, made the discussion on the Arctic issues possible and more open. Furthermore, 
this thesis assumes that Finland was a kind of an arbitrator between the superpowers, the 
Soviet Union and the United States, and used much effort to bring these superpowers 
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around the same table on Arctic issues. Due to this role of arbitrator, the thesis 
hypothesises that Finland had the power to bring together Arctic states and therefore was 
the conductor. Moreover, the thesis hypothesises that the long and unique history of 
Finland and Russia made Finland’s diplomacy particularly sensitive towards Russia, and 
this helped Finland to take the lead in the debate. In addition, this sensitivity helped 
Finland to act immediately to Gorbachev's speech on October 1987. Finland’s proposal, 
as well as the fact to be the hosting country, was crucial to the successfulness of The 
Commission on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) meeting in 1975 – could it be a similar 
case in the Arctic process? 
 
 
1.5 Sources and Methodology 
 
The primary source for this thesis is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland’s Archive 
documents. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland’s Archive (FIN-AMFA) has a 
comprehensive collection of documents concerning Arctic issues. These files begin with 
the year 1983 and are researched in this thesis from the year 1986 to September 1989. It 
is notable that the Archive has files about Arctic issues from 1983 onwards, even though 
Finland’s activity started only in 1986. The documents are memorandums, telegrams 
from Finland’s embassies abroad to Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and vice 
versa, conversation memos, meeting memos, and all documents concerned Arctic issues 
in a way or another. The two most active authors are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Adviser and diplomat Esko Rajakoski and Ambassador of Finland to Canada and Head 
of Political Department in Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Jaakko Blomberg. 
These documents have been top-secret and under the 25-year encryption rule, so the 
documents of the year have been released in 2014. Moreover, this thesis has used leading 
newspaper articles about Arctic negotiations. The articles have been saved in the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of Finland’s archive. Moreover, the context includes an extensive 
literature review listed in the References chapter – for instance, Heininen’s 
comprehensive production has been widely used in this thesis. Moreover, Markku 
Heikkilä, journalist and researcher from the University of the Lapland, has published 
numerous articles, essays, and books from the Arctic region and Arctic cooperation. His 
works are also used as a reference in this thesis many times.   
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For background information and building the context, in thesis has been used 
contemporary memoirs. Furthermore, for deepening experiences of contemporaries, the 
materials of the two Summer Academy for Security Policy arranged by 
Rauhanpuolustajat ry in the middle of July 1987 and 1988 have been used.37 Area of 
Academies’ interest was Northern Europe and the Arctic area. These events consisted of 
high-class speeches, for instance, speech keepers were professors, MP’s and docents, and 
reflection on experiences and opportunities for cooperation. Thematic issues were 
security policy situation, indigenous people, environmental protection, and regional 
cooperation.38  
 
The research is qualitative. For the first two questions, data is analysed with the traditional 
approach, whereby the chronology of events is reviewed – the interplay of political 
dynamics helps to understand the insight in Finland’s Arctic diplomacy in the late Cold 
War. More straightforwardly, the thesis uses content analysis: firstly, the relevant 
documents have been carefully gone through and then explained how the decision-makers 
justified the accessions behind closed doors.39 
 
The examination of the previous research had led to hypotheses and research questions to 
this thesis. These questions are being answered by using the data from archives of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The archive material is described chronologically and 
narratively. To this description, the thesis reflects the research questions and hypotheses 
and draws conclusions via this procedure. By this, the data is analysed from a particular 
predefined perspective, which is common in qualitative research. 40 
  
																																								 																				
37 in English ‘Registered Association of Peace Defenders’ 
38 Heininen, Lassi (ed.) (1987a). Kuhmon henki 1987: Turvallisuuspoliittisen kesäakatemian 
aineisto. Hki: Suomen rauhanpuolustajat, 7.	
39 Eskola, J. (1998). Johdatus laadulliseen tutkimukseen. Vastapaino,Tampere,  7–12 ja 153–
154. 
40 Eskola 1998, 154. 
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2 The Rise of Arctic Politics 
 
2.1 Overall International Situation 
 
The 1980s meant for the Cold War a growing confrontation; the détente of the 1970s were 
gone, and low-tense coexistence was displaced by psychological warfare and armaments 
race41. The power balance has been said to have turned to favor the West and the US 
during the 1980s. It has been argued that after realising this, the Soviet Union had no 
choice but started to engage with the mighty West42. However, the development that led 
to the Arctic cooperation would not have been possible without significant political 
changes in the 1980s Soviet as well43. At the beginning of the 1980s, previous Soviet 
leaders Dmitri Ustinov and Konstantin Chernenko passed away, and after a short leader 
bargain, the youngest Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power. Gorbachev 
started to remove corrupted bureaucrats and started a transparency campaign.44  The 
Glasnost, presented by Gorbachev in 1986 within the slogan of perestroika, was a brief 
and distinctive period that ended to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.45 Glasnost 
was a term widely used, meaning a new way of openness of the state and can be seen as 
a weak attempt to answer to the global trend of transparency. Ultimately, glasnost meant 
to collapse for the Soviet Union; the country was not able to survive with the public 
dealing with its incongruencies in governance.46  
 
The Soviet Union changed its international role in 1987 and started to negotiate actively 
with western countries. Gorbachev wrote the book ‘Perestroika: New Thinking for Our 
Country and the World’ where he created an image of the Soviet Union as an active actor 
in international relations and one natural part in the democratic world. Furthermore, 
Gorbachev had a style called ‘Gorbachev’s Westernism’. This westernism included 
																																								 																				
41 Zubok, Vladislav M. (2009) A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin 
to Gorbachev. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 265.  
42 Zubok 2009, 305. 
43 Heikkilä 2006, 11. 
44 Zubok 2009, 277–279. 
45 Brown, Archie (2006) The Gorbachev era. Article in Suny, R. G. (ed.): The Cambridge 
History of Russia: Volume 3, The Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 
316–317 & 323. 
46 Michener, G. & Bersch, K. (2013) Identifying transparency. Information Polity, 18(3), 235 & 
240. 
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behavior similar to Western politicians and deep connections outside the Eastern side. 
However, the most reason for this was the aim to get the Soviet Union's return to Europe’; 
Gorbachev wanted the Soviet Union to be an open society in Europe, not Stalin-like 
closed society outside Europe. Furthermore, the newly warmed relations between the 
Soviet Union and the US created in the US a phenomenon called ‘Gorbymania.’ 
According to Vladislav Zubok, Gorbachev had a personal urge to unify North America, 
Europe, and the Soviet Union.47 Zubok, however, did not mention the cooperation for the 
Arctic area at all. 
 
The winds of change in the Soviet Union were not the only triggering event for the need 
for multilateral cooperation in the Arctic. The weapon technology improved year after 
year since World War II, and, for example, nuclear submarines and missile technology 
raised the importance of the Arctic Ocean as well. Thus, the Arctic Ocean became a 
significant area for the Cold War parties. Also, even though the East-West –tension 
lowered within the end of the Cold War, the Arctic armament was a still valid question at 
the end of the 1980s. Both superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, had updated their 
maritime strategies, and accordingly, they started to direct military power to the Arctic. 
Moreover, the presence of nuclear weapons in the Arctic region brought the question of 
environmental safety into daylight. Environmental pollution and the risk of nuclear 
accidents demanded negotiations on the multilateral level. In other words, the security 
and operational environment in the Arctic region changed significantly at the turn of the 
1980s and the 1990s. However, the region’s geopolitical position was still at the 
intersection of several countries' interests, and this makes the area sensitive to fluctuations 
in international relations. Furthermore, the geopolitical position became more 
complicated due to the identification of environmental problems.48 
 
In one of the very first agreements in the Arctic, in the Svalbard Treaty, signed 1920 by 
nine countries including, for example, the US, gave to Norway sovereignty over Svalbard, 
group of islands between the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The Soviet Union refused 
to sign the treaty first but eventually joined in 1935. The archipelago around Svalbard 
was under Norway’s control as well, but the Treaty left loopholes for sea-areas. 
																																								 																				
47 Zubok 2009, 308–309,316–317 & 322. 
48 Heininen 1999, 9,56–57,92–93 & 295–296. 
	 16	
Furthermore, the sea areas were affluent in fish, the area had been decades a fishing area 
of disharmony, especially between Soviet and Norway.49  
 
For Denmark, Greenland was the main factor for the Arctic Identity: Without Greenland, 
Denmark would not have met the criteria for being an Arctic state. Greenland was an 
autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland’s era under Danish 
power began in 1775.50   Greenland gained its autonomic in 1979, and before that, 
Denmark used a rather tight colonial policy in the area, and therefore, the United Nations 
gave notice to Denmark about this policy. After autonomic status, Greenland has had its 
own policy lines, which has, from time to time, been separated from the Danish line. The 
foremost example was from 1985 when Greenland decided to leave the European 
Community due to the disagreements with fishery policies. Separate policy lines, even in 
the foreign policy, were made possible in 1979 autonomic status, where the Greenlandic 
nation was given full legitimacy, for example, for its juridical, foreign, and security 
policy.51 
 
Since autonomy, the Soviet was interested in Greenland, and the policy of friendship was 
apparent52. However, during the Cold War, Greenland’s geological location made it very 
interesting for both the West and East. The reason for interest was that the sea area called 
Greenland-Iceland-the UK Gap was the main outlet to the open waters for Soviet 
vessels.53 According to Annika Bergman Rosamond, Denmark is and has been a more 
significant player than its size suggests54. This might be explained that Denmark has 
always had a robust military point of view in the Arctic issues, perhaps since it was a 
NATO member state and was, in fact, a founder country55.  In the Cold War era, Denmark 
was, alongside other Scandinavian countries, promoting justice, peace, and international 
																																								 																				
49 Hønneland, G. & Jensen, L. C. (2015) Norway’s approach to the Arctic: policies and 
discourse. An article in Jensen Leif Christian & Hønneland Geir (ed.): Handbook of the Politics 
of the Arctic. Edwar Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 465–464. 
50 Rosamond Bergman Annika (2015) The Kingdom of Denmark and the Arctic. An article in 
Jensen Leif Christian & Hønneland Geir (ed.): Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic. Edwar 
Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 505–506 and 508. 
51 Rosamond 2015, 508–509. 
52 Hulden, Anders. 13.1.1986. Grönlanti-Neuvostoliitto-Tanska-Yhdysvallat-Islanti. FIN-AMFA 
13.40-1. 
53 Young, Oran B. (1985) The Age of the Arctic. Article in Foreign Policy. Winter 1985/86, 161. 
54 Rosamond 2015, 501. 
55 Rosamond 2015, 502 and 509. 
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laws, and this made a mark for Denmark’s role in the early years of Arctic cooperation as 
well. Denmark’s line in Arctic cooperation has been based on military issues, 
institutionalism, and indigenous rights.56 
 
For the US, the Arctic region appeared as a playing field for foreign policy and natural 
resources. When the Soviet Union was arming the Arctic, the US could not only watch at 
the situation if it wanted to keep the balance of power policy, and vice versa. What comes 
to natural resources, oil and gas were the most wanted, and the Arctic area was a suitable 
place to exploit those both. The race after oil began in the late 1960s when a significant 
oil discovery occurred in Alaska. After that, nothing was unchanged; the discovery led 
countries, industry, companies, environmental organisations, and aboriginals to protect 
their interest in the Arctic. However, the situation was not unique in the US; Canada had 
a similar trend in its Arctic islands. Furthermore, this race after natural resources led to a 
situation where nations, mainly the US, Canada, and the Soviet Union, brought their 
research stations to the Arctic areas and seas occurring tensions due to the uncertainty 
which country owns which area. When the situation of the revival of indigenous peoples' 
demands for their land was added to the rivalry of the natural resources, the regional 
problem became complex. There were demands in the land, shore, and sea areas.57 
 
Ultimately, the complex regional disputes created a constant need for negotiations, 
agreements, new legislation, and establishment of interest groups. For instance, the UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea was modified multiple times between the years 1950–
1980. Especially the indigenous people woke up to the environmental and regional 
damage caused by the usage and exploitation of natural resources. For instance, in 1973, 
the Arctic Peoples’ Conference aboriginals discussed how to provide a solid voice against 
the misusages of the southern countries. Furthermore, when the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference was held by Canadians, Greenland’s, and Alaska’s aboriginals in 1977, they 
declared the establishment of the new organisation, The Inuit Circumpolar Organisation, 
by arguing that it was  
“the only means whereby we can secure an efficient and successful 
protection of our common Arctic environment”58 
																																								 																				
56 Rosamond 2015, 501–502. 
57 Grant D. Sheland (2011) Polar Imperative. A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America. 
Douglas & McIntyre, Vancouver, 339–343. 
58 Grant 2011, 368–376. 
	 18	
 
When looking at this intertwined and tense situation, it is no wonder that among Arctic 
countries begun to have profound and long-lasted hopes for Arctic cooperation in the 
1980s. As a summary, it could be said that countries were indirectly forced to work 
together even before the Arctic Council. The US and the Soviet Union had Arctic 
countries between leading to a situation where partners were needed: for example, the US 
confederated via NATO to Norway and bilaterally with Canada and Denmark. However, 
the cooperation was not always favorable, and the warmth of friendships varied 
considerably during the Cold War. The relationship between America and Canada, in 
particular, was sometimes cold, but sometimes the ties were neutral. Thus, at the end of 
the Cold War, the countries were linked to each other, to world politics, to regional 
pressure organisations, and environmental pressures. Finally, in the 1980s, the Arctic 
region was an actual net of linkages and different areal agreements. 
 
 
2.2 Finland in the Turmoil of the Cold War 
 
Even though the Arctic cooperation did not start to warm up until the 1980s, Finland’s 
acts and reactions cannot be understood without looking at Finland’s path to the 1980s 
all way from the beginning of the Cold War. Finland had a unique location in the East-
West –tensions being between the border of the NATO and the Soviet Union. 
 
Finland has remained militarily neutral since World War II. Reid Standish described 
Finland’s role as a balancer between east and west as ‘Europe’s Bear Whisperer’59. In the 
role of a balancer during the Cold War, Finland had an urge to join as fast it could to the 
West, simultaneously having in-depth knowledge about the fact that Finland’s foreign 
policy always had as a number one priority good relationship to the Soviet Union. 
Finland’s foreign policy was more or less passive and defensive. Hopes were not high; 
an almost only clear trend was to keep excellent and confidential relations with the Soviet 
Union. At late as the 1980s, a most foreign policy program of Finnish parties’ objective 
																																								 																				
59 Standish, R. 7.3.2016.  Article in Foreign Policy: How Finland Became Europe’s Bear 
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was to retain independence and preservation of the Finland’s social system instead of big 
visions of internationalisation. The main target in foreign policy was, thus, to keep 
Finland out of any war. 60 This had been the case from the beginning of the Cold War: 
The Prime Minister of Finland defined Finland’s role in the late 1940s. This so-called 
Paasikivi Line consisted of adapting to the vital strategic interests of the Soviet Union 
and striving to preserve its social system and sovereignty for as long as possible, bearing 
in mind that the Soviet Union was able at any time to come and take these targets away.61   
 
Moreover, in the 1980s, war-scenario was still an actual cause for anxiety, rapid 
armament race in the North had caused fears even among neutral states. Nevertheless, 
Finland did not act like federal programs spoke: a decade after decade, Finland connected 
itself more and more to different Western unions. Finland warmed diplomatic relations 
with Western countries, and if some explanations were needed, Finland always invoked 
economic reasons instead of political ones.62   
 
Finland retained independence, and the Paris Peace Treaty was made in 1947. Soon after 
the Treaty, the Soviet Union started to propose security guarantees from Finland. So, 
eventually, this led to an agreement on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, the 
Finno–Soviet Treaty63, which was renewed three times and it lasted to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, to the year 1992.64 Thus, the agreement was still in force when the Arctic 
negotiations were going on in the late 1980s. The Soviet Union made economic 
agreements with Finland as well, and the first five-year trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union was signed in 195065. After, and somewhat simultaneously, these agreements with 
the Soviet Union, Finland started to make agreements and join different unions with the 
West. At first, Finland started to join international economic associations which were 
under the United Nations (UN), for example, Finland joined in the International Monetary 
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. When the 
																																								 																				
60 Railo, Erkka (2010) Pienen valtion kansallinen selviytymisstrategia. An Article in Erkka 
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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951 and eventually 
developed to the European Community (EC) in 1967, Finland did not join due to the 
relationship with the Soviet Union. However, step by step, Finland was able to make 
association agreements with the Western unions, usually after when negotiated similar 
conditions to the Soviet Union. In short, Finland made an association agreement with 
European Free Trade Association in1961, joined in Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1969, made a free trade agreement with EEC 
in 1974 and with the ECSC in 1975.66 
 
In addition, or even as a basis, to the Western trend, Finland had a close relationship with 
Nordic countries. This Nordic cooperation was quite well-tolerated from the Soviet 
Union’s side, and alignments with Nordic countries were a good starting point for the 
Western trend. These Finland’s connections with Nordic countries had been described as 
‘Finland’s window to the West.’ The first step was The Nordic Passport Union in 1952, 
followed by the Common Nordic Labor Market in 1954 and the Nordic Convention on 
Social Security in 1955. Nevertheless, some collaborations were tenser, and then Finland 
needed to balance between the Soviet Union and Nordic countries.67  Thus, when the 
Nordic Council was established in 1952, but the tense situation in the world’s politics was 
estimated in Finland so that Finland was not possible to join Council without the Soviet 
Union’s reactions, and therefore, Finland decided not to even apply for the Council.68 
 
After the death of the Soviet Union’s President Josef Stalin, the tight world situation 
changed to détente. To the head of the Soviet Union rose Nikita Khrushchev, and under 
his leadership, the Soviet Union saw Finland's neutrality more positively.69 Détente gave 
Finland new possibilities, and eventually, Finland joined the Nordic Council in 195570. 
The next sensitive subject was the Nordek, which was negotiated during the years 1968–
1970. It would have had new regulations for the Nordic customs union and economic 
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community, which would have led to close cooperation among Nordic countries. 
However, the Soviet Union saw the Nordek as a threat and pressured Finland to abandon 
the project.71  
 
As an example of Finland’s East-West -balancing, in the 1970s, Finland had a significant 
role in Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations. The 
process started in the early 1970s when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev proposed 
international negotiations for these sensitive issues.72 Finland’s role as an organiser and 
host in the CSCE created an image of Finland as a neutral country between two 
superpowers. Moreover, eventually, the conference made Finland’s position as an 
independent player stronger even though the Soviet Union did not give any neutral 
recognition. This role as the independent player was much needed: On the other hand, 
Finland had to convince the West that Finland is a sovereign country having its own will. 
On another hand, the Soviet Union needed proof that Finland’s belonging to Western 
unions was not a threat to them.73 However, Finland being a host for the CSCE could not 
have been possible without the change in world politics, as it has been in many other cases 
in the Cold War as well. Furthermore, Finland’s role as a host was made possible by the 
settlement of the question of two Germanys. This settlement made Finland’s position 
easier because Finland was the only country in Europe that had not established 
relationships with either one. When this tricky question was solved, and Finland was out 
of the compression: this made the possibility for Finland to be able for a potential 
impartial host for negotiations. One cannot underestimate the importance of the CSCE to 
the world: Conference confirmed the borders for European countries and regulated a rule 
that borders could be changed only by peaceful means.74  
 
Furthermore, the Conference regulated many rules for human rights and civil liberties. 
Therefore, Finland was momentarily an unbound stage for the whole world, and this 
opportunity had tremendous meaning to Finland’s position.75 It might be that without the 
role of a host for the CSCE, Finland would not have been seen as a potential host country 
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for the Arctic negotiations. However, despite the peaceful acts in the CSCE, the détente 
period was starting to fade away, and the tensions in world politics begun to tighten 
again76. 
 
In the 1980s, Finland’s foreign policy primarily belonged to the President, together with 
the Foreign Minister. During the President Mauno Koivisto’s (1982–1994) season, 
foreign policy changed from the previous line. Beforehand Finland’s foreign policy was 
firmly policy of neutrality. Koivisto shifted this towards the line: “Finland emphasises 
the importance of maintaining good relations with neighbouring countries, but also with 
all other countries in the world.”77 
 
Finland’s Prime minister in 1983–1987, Kalevi Sorsa, had described the times of the 
1980s and early 1990s as a time when Finland’s foreign policy needed total revise. Only 
the fundamental pillars could be left unchanged, but otherwise, all was needed to be 
changed. Change in world order was a significant turn for Finland located next to the 
former superpower. Western Europe was further integrating, and Eastern Europe was 
breaking into smaller units. Europe had not had any wars since World War II, and due to 
the collapse of the East, there was a sense of crisis in the air. The situation was tense. 
Agreements concluded after the world wars, and the CSCE seemed toothless in the 
battlefield of nationalistic movements. When the Soviet was seemingly falling apart, 
Sorsa argued that Finland should concentrate on the Baltic Sea, the Baltic countries and 
into converging Europe. Sorsa promoted cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and was 
pro-active in European integration, in the European Community, but not, however, 
mentioning at all the Arctic cooperation.78 Interesting is that Sorsa did mention many 
other global cooperation projects, issues, and problems where Finland played a role as 
well countries, for example, in environmental issues79. Furthermore, Sorsa mentioned 
only once that Finland’s location in Europe’s North could be in the future turn into 
economic prosperity instead of being an encumbrance, as seen at the end of the Cold 
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War80. Despite the lack of mention, Sorsa’s thought that Finland’s foreign policy needed 
total revise suits well to Finland’s new opening to the Arctic. Moreover, even though 
Sorsa had not mentioned the northern dimension on his books, during the times when 
working as a Prime Minister, he encouraged Finland to be active in discussions of the 
usage of the northern natural resources and environmental protection. He saw that as a 
northern country, Finland had a crucial foreign policy mission to observe and solve 
challenges in its immediate vicinity.81 
 
Not only foreign policy was in a situation to total revise, economy and trade, mainly 
export, were afraid. Finland’s export still relied in the 1980s mainly on forest products. 
In fact, 36% of Finland’s exports in 1988 was from forest products.82 Moreover, these 
were combined with the fact that Finland’s largest trade partner was, still, the Soviet 
Union. In fact, the whole Cold War period was a Golden Age for the Finland’s economy, 
and the Soviet Union had been a crucial part of this success as a buyer. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union bought exactly those forest products what were Finland’s concerns. During 
the 1980s, an acute fear was born after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which raised many 
questions about forests' future. Furthermore, green parties started to pop up in many 
countries, in Finland as well. This combination raised new discussion about forestry, and 
when topics about pollution-related tree deaths rose concurrently with demands on 
lowering forest cutting, Finland saw forest opportunities in the northern forests and in the 
international cooperation in lowering environmental damages.83 Thus, one can say that 
the Soviet Union was a root for the concern, but at the same time, the buyer for the forests 
products and it is not a wonder that Finland became concerned about the environmental 
and economic situation, in addition to the overall security atmosphere, and started to act. 
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2.3 Gorbachev’s Speech in Murmansk in October 1987 
 
The Soviet Union was geographically the largest country in the world, and it had an 
extensive coastline along the Arctic Ocean. Indeed, under the Soviet Union's rule was 
almost half of the Arctic Ocean’s coastal areas.84 Furthermore, the Soviet Union was, and 
had been for decades, dependent on the Arctic area for its economic development85. 
During Soviet times, these northern parts of the Soviet Arctic were in a significant role 
with natural resources and optimal geostrategic location86. For instance, the world's only 
fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers had advanced the economic exploitation and 
militaristic aims of the Arctic continental shelf of the Soviet Union's territories for many 
decades.87 The scientific development and exploration, however, accelerated in the turn 
of the 19th and 20th centuries. At first, the Arctic was an essential symbolic sphere for 
colonial and imperial conquest. However, the Soviet Union was not alone with this; the 
British and Norwegian fleets were doing the very same in other parts of the Arctic Ocean 
to gain more control. Natural resources, land, and sea control were in their all minds, but 
it could also be said that the indigenous people were seen as a resource as well.88  Thus, 
when Gorbachev’s speech shook the Arctic world, it is no wonder: the fact that as much 
as one-fifth of the Soviet’s land was beyond the Arctic Circle made the Gorbachev worth 
consulting. 
 
Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk in October 1987 started with a counterreaction: 
Gorbachev claimed that the West has been accusing the Soviet Union with outdated 
information when discussing Arctic issues: 
“everything would seem to be as it was before: the same anti-Soviet attacks, 
the same demands that we show our commitment to peace by renouncing 
our order and principles, the same confrontational language: 
´totalitarianism´, ´communist expansion´, and so on.” 
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Gorbachev argued that the Soviet Union has changed from the Soviet past.89 From this 
thesis point of view, the Soviet Union needed a break with the past if longing for further 
cooperation. The northern part of the Soviet Union had a very questionable past, and if 
the Soviet Union wanted to be a credible partner in the arctic cooperation, it had no chose 
than to take a step forward from the previous misdemeanors. 
 
The Russian strive for the Arctic areas begun already in Russia’s tsarist years. The first 
network of inhabitants started to settle to the northern part of Russia as early as from the 
14th century onwards. However, agriculture never occurred in the Arctic areas of Russia 
in the same way as in the Scandinavian region; the density of the population stayed low 
and did not satisfy tsars. That insight was the first step towards a rigid policy for growing 
the population density by forced settlement in the Russian North.90 After the Russian 
Revolution in 1917, the Soviets started to implement a Marxian, urban, and industrial 
development to the distant areas of North91. 
 
On the other hand, this development is not exceptional; the whole empire went through a 
similar experiment — decision-maker after another applied Marxist socialism to remote 
Russian areas from their starting points and aspirations. The primary line was, however, 
the revolution of the working class, along with heavy industrial and technological 
development. “Economy on the taiga and tundra” was mainline from Stalin to 
Brezhnev.92 And the policy line has changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union very 
little, and even currently, Arctic areas have been very highly promoted by Putin and 
Medvedev.93  
 
When the Soviet Union started to give special attention to the Arctic areas, the assumption 
was to create new cities and industries into emptiness – native people were too 
underdeveloped to be taken even account. The aim to industrialise and modernise rapidly 
																																								 																				
89 Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.  
90 Kauppala, Pekka (1998) Venäjän Pohjola. Valtiollisen asutustoiminnan synty, kukoistus ja 
nykytila. Studies on the Northern Dimension. No.1. Venäjän ja Itä-Euroopan Instituutti, 
Helsinki, 9 & 13. 
91 Josephson 2014, 2–3. 
92 Josephson 2014, 4–5; Kaiser, Robert J. (1994) The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and 
in the USSR. Princetown University Press, Princetown, 96–97. 
93 Josephson 2014, 2–3 and 10–11. 
	 26	
during the times of the Soviet Union meant that the whole Arctic region was dealt 
according to the state’s central plan. Nature, humans, and natural resources were 
altogether controlled and valued as a resource for political, economic, and military 
power.94 At the end of the 1920s, the unlimited power by Stalin and his supporters meant 
the policy of economic colonisation of the Arctic region. The first Five Year Plan began 
in 1928 with the aim of massive industrialisation and militarisation. Concurrently, the 
state started a much higher penetration into the region, and a new period of rigid 
centralised planning was initiated. This meant even the collectivisation of Siberian 
reindeer and fishing, but as well fur and other industries. These in the 1920s begun events 
have been crucial for the northern part of Russia; those built-up administrative systems 
lasted through the Soviet times. By the beginning of the 1930s, vast deposits of natural 
minerals, like copper, nickel, and other iron ores, were discovered in the Arctic region.95  
 
Simultaneously, Stalin and his administrates realised that the exploitation of natural 
resources would be extremely expensive, for example, due to the need for a high salary 
for getting workers to move to remote areas. These costs meant forced collectivisation of 
peasants, as well, because of the requirement of a significant amount of ‘free labor,' which 
was not available in the North. However, one of Stalin’s aim was to push the Siberian 
peoples out of their primitivism, hence working in an industrial concern became a real 
possibility for indigenous Siberians. However, the Siberians were not enough; vast 
amounts of forced labor was needed.  Therefore, the socialisation of Arctic was made 
through compulsory collectivisation, as well as with the prisoners from labor camps. 
These gulag prisoners, along with deported urban residents and, for example, political 
prisoners, were forcibly removed to remote regions of Siberia and the North. These cruel 
deportations enabled the phenomena leading to the rapid growth of the population in the 
remote Arctic areas. The amount people deported to Arctic areas yearly, 1–1 ½ million, 
was approximately the same amount that was population there originally.96  
 
One spectacular remark of this Soviet’s slave economy was the cities risen from 
emptiness, for instance, cities of Norilsk and Vorkuta. Other massive projects were 
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several railroads in the harsh nature of the North, as well as the very striking project: The 
Canal of the White Sea. However, the insanity of the plans shows in the project where 
more than 700 km of a railway was drawn to Siberia, only for left it be unfinished and 
revert to forest.97 
 
This rapid need for industrialisation and urbanisation meant a little attention to the 
environmental questions, and therefore this Soviet industry had a long-term impact on the 
region's, for example, natural specie98. The massive industrialisation was made possible 
with recently developed hydropower. However, indigenous people’s need for fishing was 
not taken into account when hydropower stations were planned. Furthermore, over time, 
the heavy industry had polluted rives widely and caused many troubles for fishing 
tradition.99 These events, forced industrialisation and urbanisation, gulags, and other 
state-driven systems, lead to the military culture. Cities formed to islets without contact 
with other centers or regions. Relation to agriculture broke competently, partly because 
there was no agriculture, and the security of supply was based on supplies from other 
areas. Urban centers were specialised in one production area, and the equity ratio was 
weak; the northern settlement in Russia became unbalanced. When the forced labor force 
was mainly abandoned, the area required massive subsidies, and the Arctic became to the 
Soviet Union an expensive area.100 Thus, taken this nature and human abused past to 
account, it is not any wonder why President Gorbachev’s speech included a part where 
he made a strict distinction from the past. 
 
After this detachment, President Gorbachev had a chapter where he stressed the 
importance of the Reykjavik Summit in 1986. He even saw it as a turning point in world 
history: It confirmed the Soviet Union to act towards cooperation in many spheres and 
one of the essential levels in the Arctic cooperation. Gorbachev mentions that the 
superpowers have recently made good progress in their relations, but much more could 
be done. Then he continues to the Arctic region and is suggesting a radical lowering of 
the level of military confrontation in the region. He mentions countries that had done 
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good work with these issues, and among others, he mentions Finland, President Urho 
Kekkonen, President Koivisto, and Sorsa as well. 101 President Kekkonen was mentioned 
due to his proposal for the Northern Nuclear-Free Zone, which Kekkonen renewed in 
1978.102 Furthermore, Gorbachev mentions the CSCE in Helsinki 1975: 
“It is significant that the historic Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe was held in one of the northern capitals - Helsinki. --- Major 
initiatives in the sphere of international security and disarmament are 
associated with the names of famous political figures of Northern Europe. 
One is Urho Kekkonen. Another is Olof Palme, whose death at the hand of 
a vile assassin shocked Soviet people. Then there is Kalevi Sorsa, who has 
headed the Socialist International Advisory Council for many years now. -
-- we welcome the initiative of Finland's President Mauno Koivisto on 
restricting naval activity in the seas washing the shores of Northern 
Europe.”103  
 
 
Thus, Gorbachev mentioned Finland in many parts of the speech. However, he had no 
apparent order, or he did not wish for Finland to start act towards further cooperation in 
the Arctic. On the contrary, an exciting line in the speech is when Gorbachev is inviting 
Arctic nations to join the same table and discuss cooperation in the Arctic. 
“Therefore, while in Murmansk, and standing on the threshold of the Arctic 
and the North Atlantic, I would like to invite, first of all, the countries of the 
region to a discussion on the burning security issues.”104  
 
In this paragraph, Gorbachev proposed the countries of the region to gather together to 
solve Arctic issues. He did not mention any list of countries that would have revealed his 
thoughts about the participants. However, countries mentioned in different parts of the 
speech are Finland, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, the US. Therefore, one 
could think that these eight Arctic countries, which were going to be asked for deepen 
cooperation, were the ones the Soviet leader was thinking. Thus, if this is a crucial aspect 
because then Gorbachev made demarcation where the Arctic sea shoreline was not a 
crucial criterion.105 
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Furthermore, in his speech, Gorbachev listed six proposal for the artic: a nuclear-free zone 
in Northern Europe, restricting naval activity in the Arctic seas, peaceful cooperation in 
developing the resources of the North, cooperation in the scientific exploration of the 
Arctic, the cooperation of the northern countries in environmental protection and lastly, 
normalisation of international relations due for opening the North Sea Route to foreign 
ships.106 Gorbachev was known to have a repulsion for the usage of military power, and 
the speech in Murmansk had many aims toward this. This turn to the idea of nonviolence 
was gratefully received on the Western side, but on the contrary, it was an extraordinary 
idea among the people in the Soviet Union. The non-use of the force seemed like a 
weakness instead of seeing it as ideal thinking from the head of state. Moreover, 
according to Zubok, Gorbachev had a personal urge to unify North America, Europe, and 
the Soviet Union.107 Zubok, however, did not mention at all the cooperation for the Arctic 
area, but still, the Murmansk speech illustrates well the urge to cooperate and lower 
military power, argued by Zubok. As a result of these sides of Gorbachev, he got much 
negative feedback in the late 1980s; his diplomats blamed him for negotiating bad 
contracts for the Soviet Union. Even though Arctic cooperation is not mentioned, it 
occurred in the same period: Gorbachev has been said to make his worst deals after 1988 
because he was obsessed with the will to end the Cold War.108   
 
Even though the Gorbachev’s speech had been said surprised many, primarily due to the 
arms reduction parts, diplomat and historian Krister Walbäck argued in materials of 
Kuhmo Summer Academy 1988 that President Gorbachev’s speech could have been 
foreseen after the member of the Soviet Politburo Jegor Ligatshov's visit in November 
1986. Ligatshov visited Finnish Social Democratic Party in Helsinki and gave a statement 
about measures, which were underway in the military district of Leningrad and the Baltic 
Sea. With these measures, the Soviet Union had unilaterally embarked on a reduction of 
nuclear weapons in the Northern regions. 109  However, with the data of this thesis, 
Walbäck’s argument remains unique.  
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3 First Steps from Arctic Tensions to Arctic Convention 
 
3.1 Finland’s Security and Environmental Policies Compounded 
 
Even though the Gorbachev’s speech was a valid starting point as well to the international 
level of Arctic cooperation but as well to Finland’s activity, Finland had had Arctic policy 
before the speech. The first document in Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affair ‘s (MFA) 
Arctic files reveals the urge that Finland had to cooperate on Arctic issues internationally 
is from late 1986. Prime Minister Sorsa was going to negotiate with Sweden’s Prime 
Minister Carlsson, and MFA sent background information for the upcoming meeting. The 
message of the memo was that Finland had heard about the plans of building a forum for 
scientific cooperation and was wondering why Finland, Iceland, and Sweden had been 
left outside of the planning process hosted by Norway. Furthermore, the memo stresses 
that Finland and Sweden were willing to join in cooperation.110  Thus, even though 
Norway had been the one to set up the cooperation, instead of Norway, the memo was 
addressed to Finland's Prime Minister. Finland's Prime Minister was heading to meet 
Sweden’s Prime minister, and for this reason, it could be said that Finland tried to join in 
by acting in cooperation with Sweden. Finland was not only trying to get in but was also 
informing other outsiders as well: Finland ambassador in Reykjavik told about the 
cooperation plans to Iceland’s Foreign Ministry, which did not know about the plans. As 
a result of this, Iceland hoped that all three, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland, would start 
together negotiations with Norway about this scientific cooperation.111  
 
Simultaneously, the Finland’s ambassador in Canada was inquiring about Canada’s 
attitude toward to plan; Canada committed to promoting Finland and Sweden to the 
cooperation. For Canada, Iceland was not so crucial than Finland and Sweden were. 
However, Canada did not have anything against Iceland to join in the cooperation.112 
Canada was so keen to have Finland included in the Arctic cooperation that Canada 
handed over to Finland documents about cooperation sent from Norway to Canada113. 
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Norsk Polarinstitut wrote those files, and files revealed that participants for the Arctic 
Science Committee were initially planned to be an organisation with Arctic rim nations 
only, even though it is interesting why Iceland was not invited. However, after the US 
suggestion about nations within territories beyond Arctic Circle, Finland, Sweden, and 
Iceland would be included, and Norway was asking from other Arctic rim nations what 
they were thinking about including the three nations mentioned. The document reveals, 
as well, that, for instance, goals and mode of operation, were yet to be decided. 
Furthermore, it confirms that the Soviet Union had not yet responded to Norway’s 
proposal.114 
 
Only a few days after, Finland, as well as Sweden, got an invitation letter to join and 
discuss plans to establish a new organisation. However, Iceland did not get an 
invitation.115 Finland got an invitation without the need to ask invitation from Norway. 
Finland promised to Iceland to support Iceland's invitation. About the theme of 
Committee Holger Rotkirch wrote that the West and the East did not have any cooperation 
in the scientific arena, and the committee aimed to prevent duplication in the Arctic 
studies. However, the response from the Soviet Union was still missing.116 When Finland 
told its support for Iceland, Iceland asked Finland to get more information about the 
Committee117. As a consequence, it can be argued that Finland served as a link in the 
emerging scientific cooperation. However, within some route, Iceland’s enthusiasm got 
in the ears of Norway, and after Iceland got further information, it was eventually asked 
to join the meeting118. The meeting was held in February 1987, and Arctic Science 
Committee plans were decided to take further, but only if the Soviet Union is also coming 
to Committee119; the Soviet had sent only an observer to the meeting. Tuomo Kärnä, who 
attended the meeting, wrote in the memo that “Finland’s representation should be 
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sufficiently credible” for getting the Soviet Union to join. 120  That underlines the 
assumption that Finns thought that Finland played an essential role in gaining the Soviet 
Union with Committee. 
 
Finland was an active host for different levels of seminars and meetings. In September 
1987, Helsinki hosted a Round table seminar on Canadian and Nordic approaches and 
policies toward Arctic Security. The US and the Soviet Union were not invited to this 
seminar.121 In the Round table seminar, the topic was Canadian and Nordic approaches 
and policies toward Arctic Security. This seminar dared to take on its agenda tenser 
issues, for example, the impact of naval competition between the US and the Soviet 
Union. However, it should bear in mind that the US or the Soviet Union were not 
participants in this seminar. The seminar was concerned about the Arctic arms race, and 
the countries included, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, were 
described  
“they [countries] are ‘sandwiched’ between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the offensive-reactive strategic game.”122   
 
The Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) Kari Möttölä has 
gathered the discussions from the seminar to a book “The Arctic Challenge – Nordic and 
Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International 
Region”. In the book, professors or state’s high representatives commented security and 
cooperation issues in the Arctic from their own nation’s viewpoint. Finland’s position on 
the matter gave Senior Research Fellow from Institute of Military Science Kalevi Ruhala, 
Researcher Olli-Pekka Jalonen from the FIIA, Senior Research Fellow Pertti Joenniemi 
and the editor of the book, Kari Möttölä. Thus, from Finland, there was no state 
representative present.123  
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Ruhala discussed the Arctic dimension as a part of Finland’s security policy. Finland had 
the Northern dimension included to the Finnish Parliamentary Defence Committee from 
the year 1975 onwards, and Finland had stressed three main things in there: The Soviet 
Union’s strategic position in the Northern Europe, the Northern NATO states, Iceland, 
Norway and Denmark, and finally, the neutrality of Finland and Sweden. The neutral 
states, Finland and Sweden, separated the NATO and the Soviet Union geographically 
from each other. However, Finland's aim was to work actively for the friendly relations 
between Norway’s and the Soviet Union’s due to the north Norway-Soviet border, which 
was partially shared with Finland. According to Ruhala, geographically, Finland did not 
pose any threat to other nations, not even towards the two superpowers. However, Finland 
recognised tensions between the superpowers and therefore admitted if escalating to war, 
Finland would be in between the NATO and the Soviet Union. This might have then 
meant that Finland’s airspace could have been the route for missiles to fly, and then 
Finland would have been a part of war even though it would not have been an active 
participant.124  
 
So due to, for instance, this airspace situation, previous less interest aroused states, such 
as Finland, was in the middle of the area that had achieved the world's attention. Nordic 
countries, neutral or not, were dragged to a great-power rivalry, whether they wanted it 
or not. Therefore, Möttölä and Joenniemi were discussing in their article what are the 
odds to small states gain a stricter arms control for their safety and what are the means. 
Möttölä and Joenniemi aptly asked: what is the most efficient way for the Nordic 
countries themselves to contribute to the process? As a conclusion, Möttölä and 
Joenniemi argued that a more complex compound of political administration was needed 
for the Arctic to enable security and cooperation between all parties. Countries needed to 
articulate better than before, for example, in the questions of the resource-related 
cooperations, and for this, standard policies would be much needed. Möllä and Joenniemi 
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predicted that these standard policies would be sooner or later lead to an Arctic model of 
new multinational and regional political administration.125  
 
The round-table discussion was two months before the Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk. 
Slightly earlier, only a few weeks before Gorbachev’s speech, Finland’s foreign ministry 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry started to work together with arctic issues. In the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland’s (MFA) political department, Esko Rajakoski 
was named to be the head of arctic issues in the MFA, and he joined to Polar-committee 
established by the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s. This cooperation concentrated on 
trading: Finland’s unique skills and knowledge in arctic circumstances was commonly 
known, and, for example, Finnish ice breakers were a popular commodity. However, due 
to the fact that all arctic issues, trade, and the industry as well, were highly political issues 
because of the tension between two superpowers, all Finland’s international activities in 
Arctic issues were submitted to the MFA’s political department.126    
 
This mixture of environmental and foreign policies suited very well to Finland’s two high-
level politicians: their wish was to drive environmental protection cooperation as a 
foreign policy dimension. Foreign minister Paavo Väyrynen had expressed his will to use 
environmental policies together with foreign policy aims, and he had the support from the 
Chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, Member of Parliament Pertti Paasio. 
The dream was to build “an environmental OSCE”, which had born after the successful 
Baltic Sea region cooperation in the 1970s.127 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
125 Möttölä, Kari & Joenniemi, Pertti. Arctic Security Challenges and Prospects for Arms 
Control – Building on the Nordic Experience in a New Setting. An article in Möttölä, Kari (ed.) 
The Arctic Challenge – Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an 
Emerging International Region. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Westview Press, 
1988, 248–249. 
126 Rotkirch 14.9.1987. Etelämannerta ja napa-alueita koskevien kysymysten käsittely 
ulkoasiainministeriössä. Memo nr. 90. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1. 
127 Heininen 1999, 152. 
	 35	
3.2 Murmansk Momentum: Finland Invites Itself to Cooperation 
 
“Finland should not wait for an invitation, which may not come at all128.”  
– Jaakko Blomberg, 1988  
 
A very soon after Gorbachev’s speech, Finland’s Foreign Ministry made Finnish 
translation from the speech’s foreign policy part. There is a few underlining made in the 
document. Firstly, the translator has noticed that the Soviet Union suggests the radical 
reduction of military confrontation. Secondly, there is underlining in the chapter where 
Gorbachev speaks about the nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. Thirdly, Mauno 
Koivisto’s proposal for limiting military action was mentioned in speech and underlined 
in the archive’s document. Fourthly, the part where Gorbachev spoke about peaceful 
usage of natural resources has been noticed. Fifthly, the scientific research and 
Scandinavian co-operation in environmental protection in the Arctic were mentioned and 
marked in Finland. Lastly, the possibility of the Soviet Union’s permit for the Northern 
sea route was highlighted.129 
 
President Koivisto had an official visit in the Soviet Union on 6th October 1987 and 
commented the Gorbachev’s speech by saying that speech included support for Finland’s 
aim for the Nordic nuclear-free zone. Furthermore, Koivisto argued that the speech aimed 
to reduce military confrontation by having cooperation with a broad perspective in 
scientific and environmental issues. Former foreign minister Väyrynen commented on 
17th October that due to Gorbachev’s speech, Finland should raise cooperation in the 
field of environmental protection to one of Finland’s main aims in its foreign policy.130  
 
In November 1987, Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Political Department had a 
meeting called ‘Arctic Cooperation in Multilateral Institutionalized Nordic Cooperation.’ 
As the topic says, the meeting was mostly a discussion about how Nordic countries could 
cooperate within Arctic issues, for example, in the sphere of economic and environmental 
research. Research should focus on the sustainable use of natural resources. As a last issue 
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at the meeting is a note that the leftist party ‘Democratic Alternative’ had expressed a 
wish for Finland’s delegation in the Nordic Council to show obedience to Gorbachev's 
speech and be proactive.131 
 
Finland’s diplomats had many private meetings with other diplomats from the Arctic 
Eight. Among private meetings, there were meetings with diplomats and experts in arctic 
issues, usually after an invitation from a foreign ambassador. In December 1987, 
ambassador Rajakoski received an invitation from Swedish ambassador Bo Johnson 
Teutenberg and visited Swedish Polar Research Secretariat. The meeting was about both 
poles, Arctic and Antarctica. Negotiating official Rajakoski explained the discussion in 
the memo, and according to him, there were two levels of Arctic cooperation going on. 
Rajakoski made a clear border to those two; on the other hand, there was intended to 
deepen academic research cooperation, and this process had been going on for a while 
already. On the other hand, there was newly risen intend to create an Intergovernmental 
Forum on Arctic Science Issues, which was planning to proceed to the political aspects 
of the research cooperation. The scientific cooperation was planned to be open for all 
scientists, but the intergovernmental forum was planned to be only for the Arctic Eight. 
These both intend got new wind to the sails from Gorbachev’s speech, but some doubts 
about the intergovernmental cooperation had been heard. 
 
Sweden and Finland agreed to keep each other up to date about Arctic issues.132 There 
were no allusions about that Sweden or Finland would have been alone or together, 
making the next step for the Arctic cooperation. In addition to Rajakoski, a scientist Erkki 
Leppävuori from the Technical Research Centre of Finland, took part in the meeting since 
the meeting was more scientifical than political. Even though he wrote that his memo is 
more scientific than political, he has an interesting point in his memo: the plan for Arctic 
Science Committee had been quickly modified after Gorbachev’s speech, and the plan 
included thoughts from the speech. Leppävuori wrote that the Soviet Union had not taken 
a stance at this point yet. Leppävuori ended up with the comment that he strongly 
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supported that Finland joins the Arctic Science Committee.133 This meeting highlights the 
fact that even though the Arctic policy burst out after Gorbachev’s speech, political 
science in Finland had dealt the issue slightly in advance. Kuhmo had its first summer 
academy for searching for ways to relieve tension and developed cooperation on July 
1987. Furthermore, the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) established a research 
program for the Arctic in the same summer. Moreover, The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs (FIIA) arranged Nordic-Canadian round-table meeting in Helsinki 
on September 1987. 134  Moreover, this reflects the broader Nordic phenomenon of 
scientific community concern and interest in the Arctic even before Gorbachev’s speech. 
 
Finland actively followed what other Arctic states were doing and reacting; for example, 
Finland followed closely when Canada and the Soviet Union renewed the Arctic 
Exchange Programme in February 1987135. When this cooperation deepened after the 
Soviet Union made a proposal for Canada about further cooperation in the Arctic issues, 
Finland was even more interested. In the MFA’s archives, there are articles about Canada-
USSR -negotiations as well as political review made by Finland’s ambassador in 
Ottawa.136 This new cooperation attempt, as well as, Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk, 
affected to the negotiations of the International Arctic Science Committee: Committee 
decided to speed up its establishment and to bring forward publication137. Finland noticed 
these winds carefully, and when Canada and Norway made a bilateral conference on 
Arctic issues, Finland was again interested138.   
 
One crucial turning point was in December 1987, when Canada’s Secretary of State for 
External Affairs Joe Clark made a speech where he drew a line for the valid Arctic 
countries. He defined the border for the Arctic to Arctic Circle and included seven 
countries to the Arctic area, eight when including Canada. The speech was full of aims 
for international cooperation and seems like a natural continuum after Gorbachev’s 
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speech. Canada made clear proposals for further cooperation and planned the first 
meetings to be kept already in 1988. Ambassador Jaakko Blomberg’s review from Clark’s 
speech stress Canadian initiative for the ‘Arctic Basin Council,’ a government-level co-
operation organisation. According to Blomberg, this ‘Arctic Basin Council’ project had 
been planned for years in Canada with a unique research team. The basis for this project 
was dissatisfaction with bilateral cooperation favored by the Soviet Union in Arctic 
issues, and Canadians saw a multilateral level in cooperation more fruitful. After 
Gorbachev’s speech, this initiative was more contemporary than ever. In his memo, 
Blomberg estimated that the question of Northwest passage had been one big obstacle for 
Canada in bilateral cooperation in the Arctic. Finally, ambassador Blomberg wrote that 
Clark had many allusions that may lead to projects that may interest Finland as well.139  
 
Clark’s speech underlines the fact that almost every nation was keen to formulate some 
cooperation levels for the Arctic. However, Canadians were very active, they had their 
own plans for initiative as well140, and it could be said that the establishment of the 
multinational cooperation in the Arctic was traded between two nations, Canada and 
Finland. Canada’s situation, however, differed from Finland’s – it can be considered to 
be in Finland's favor that Finland did not have significant controversial issues in the 
Arctic. The Canadians unofficial initiative for wide cooperation in the Arctic did not 
proceed until the 1990, when the Finland’s initiative seemed to slow down141. Therefore, 
the Arctic Council, even though the process started from the Finland’s initiative, is 
sometimes said to be Canada’s Initiative. 
 
This was, as well, the case with other Arctic eight nations. Canadians had the question of 
the Northwest passage; the Soviet Union had grip from the Northern sea route as well as 
the bilateral rivalry with the US, and besides that, the US was keen to natural resources 
in the Arctic. Norway and Iceland had intense interests in the fishery policies in the Arctic 
area, and Denmark has the question of autonomous Greenland142. Only Sweden and 
Finland were countries that did not have any very urgent and tense issues in the area – 
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they were moreover securing themselves being in. Naturally, Sweden and Finland had 
forestry and environmental issues in the area, but compared to the issues of who is 
controlling the Arctic Sea’s area and oil and gas in the Arctic, Finland had very much less 
tense issues. However, especially to small nations like Sweden and Finland, the being in 
was a very crucial security policy line143 and therefore, it is not a surprise that they both 
were very interested in Arctic issues during the 1980s. Nevertheless, there had been 
arguments against Sweden’s arcticness, due to the situation in the 1980s, when Sweden 
did have almost any excuse for being an Arctic state; Sweden was speech after speech 
only stressing the global importance of the Arctic but was not usually at all explained 
why this was touching specifically Sweden144. 
 
The High North of Norway had lots of raw materials, but all the benefits leaked to the 
south, where economic and political centers were, and potential local markets did not 
evolve to the North145. Further, fishing was one of the primary sources of livelihood, and 
again, the industry was shared with the Soviets; the Barents Sea had abundant fish 
resources146. In 1976, after ten years of negotiations, Norway and the Soviet Union made 
bilateral arrangements for the fishery policy in the Barents Sea Region147. However, 
bilateral relations with Russia were not in favor due to the assumption of dictation policy 
from the Soviet side. Instead of bilateral ties, Norway tended to prefer multilateral 
cooperation. When Arctic cooperation emerged to BEAC, Norway considered the 
European-wide collaboration as a safeguard against Russia.148  What comes to other 
Arctic countries, Norway assigned bilateral fishing agreements with Iceland in 1980–
1981149. 
 
In addition, Norway and Denmark differed from other Scandinavian countries due to 
countries' commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a founding 
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member. Furthermore, the Russian-Norway border belonged to the Iron Curtain, the line 
separating West and East. Even though there was no conflict on that borderline, strict 
control made connections over the border impossible, affecting to the economics as well. 
On the Soviet side, the North was heavily armed, and Norway took a similar approach 
but only a lesser degree. Russia was almost solely, but a huge one, threat to Norway and 
that fact were taken seriously throughout the Cold War.150 Especially in the 1950s, Soviet 
significantly increased the northern armament equipment. In that era, nuclear weapons 
were more developed, and the Soviet’s first nuclear weapon was stationed next to 
Norway, to the Kola Peninsula.151 However, the threat from Russia had been present since 
WWII, and Norway reacted to the threat by joining NATO in 1949152.  
   
 
In 1988, the intention for Arctic cooperation and Finland's active role in it started. 
Finland’s ambassador Blomberg in Ottawa followed Arctic issues carefully and reported 
regularly changing tendencies to Finnish representatives. When Canadians activated in 
Arctic issues after Gorbachev's speech, Blomberg quickly reacted and wrote a memo in 
January 1988, where he drew lines for Finland's Arctic diplomacy. As seen from the 
future, all Blomberg's points have more or less occurred, and his memo seems almost like 
a prediction.153 Not having a shoreline on the Arctic Ocean, and without a prominent role 
in negotiations of the Arctic cooperation, it is questionable if Finland would have been 
included around a table when states are negotiating about, for example, natural resources, 
if not acted actively154. 
 
Blomberg wrote that Finland should not wait for an invitation to the emerging Arctic 
cooperation. Boundaries for the Arctic area were still unclear, and if those had been 
defined, for example, within shoreline, Finland would have been left out from the 
cooperating area. According to Blomberg, Finland was in a situation where it should be 
proactive in creating a comprehensive political framework for the Arctic. Blomberg 
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argued that the cooperation in non-military issues would have created an atmosphere 
where the arms race adjustment and the nuclear-free zone would have been gradually 
possible. He also mentioned that time was not yet suitable for the reduction of military 
activities, but the collaboration with other issues would have created trust between 
superpowers, as well as, between other countries and thereby relieve the tensions.155 
 
Blomberg described processes that were going on in the Arctic; armament race, 
exploitation of natural resources, scientific-technical research and development, 
environmental protection, and preserving the culture of the northern indigenous peoples 
and improving their living conditions. He feared that those last four peaceful processes, 
unfortunately, had come across the first, non-peaceful, one: with the armament race. 
Therefore, according to Blomberg, the cooperation was very needed. So, for the 
cooperation, he warmly recommended that Finland would start to promote the 
multilateral, international cooperation and leniency in security policy issues with the eight 
Arctic nations.156 
 
For the question, how did Finland become a key negotiator in launching Arctic 
cooperation at the end of the Cold War, academic Oran. B. Young has few reasons to 
introduce. Firstly, Finland reacted early enough to the Murmansk momentum. Secondly, 
Young claims that Finland managed as a first country wisely to respond to topics straight 
taken from Gorbachev's speech. Thirdly, Finland realised its potential neutral role as an 
arbitrator between East and West. Young claims that other Northern policymakers saw 
the situation as similar to the 1975 Helsinki Accord and realised that, individually, 
Finland could negotiate the Arctic cooperation process best. 157  Young's claims are 
consistent with the hypothesis of this thesis; however, the conscious choice of Nordic 
makers to let Finland lead the process is not visible in the Finland’s archive materials. 
 
Young argues that the growing concern of environmental issues was fertile soil for Arctic 
discussions: ecological questions were tremendous or even fashionable topics, but for the 
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success of negotiations where two superpowers were included, the environment was a 
topic not too contentious.158  
 
Quite similarly argued Senior Research Fellow at Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), Steven E. Miller in Kuhmo Academy in 1988: Miller 
discussed the Arctic maritime arms control. During the speech, it was noted that this issue 
had gained much-growing concern, in particular, in Norway, Finland, and the Soviet 
Union. It was highlighted that there was considerable naval power in the northern sea 
areas, even during peacetime, and if times of crisis had occurred, more military equipment 
would have been deployed there. Any escalation of the situation would have, thus, mean 
a significant sea battle in the Arctic. Maritime confidence-building measures, such as 
restricting military exercises and exchanging information, were proposed as a solution. 
However, operational constraints were considered too difficult to achieve in the context 
of contemporary superpower relations. In the article, there are note that Miller's proposals 
for arms control are not included in the Academy's material. There was no specific reason 
mentioned to this.159 That issue might have been too risky to say aloud. 
 
 
3.3 Finland’s Tentative Tour for Convention 
 
In his memo, Ambassador Blomberg stressed the urgency of the matter on January 1988, 
but on paper, the acts towards Finland's initiative started only in autumn when the MFA 
decided to arrange a meeting with the Arctic ambassadors in Helsinki. However, the 
document dated in late September reveals that there had been discussions between the 
Arctic eight in scientific issues: International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was 
genuinely starting to operate.160 
 
Even though officially there are no archive documents about discussions on the Arctic 
issue during spring 1988, the nascent cooperation also arose in the speeches of Finnish 
politicians. The Finno–Soviet Treaty turned 40 years during spring 1988, and at its 
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Anniversary Seminar Minister, Toivo T. Pohjola had a keynote speech, where he 
highlighted the initiative nature of Gorbachev's speech. Pohjola concentrated on the 
security aspect of the speech, and he was optimistic that in cooperative organs, problems 
in the security sphere could be possible to be solved. He suggested that an excellent 
platform for the new collaboration would be previous cooperation organs, for instance, 
the Arctic task force of the Finland-USSR Scientific and Technical Cooperation 
Committee, which was established in 1981.161 This suggestion was impressive due to its 
bilateral character instead of the international form. Finland's Prime Minister Harri 
Holkeri had a similar message when he visited the Soviet Union; he brought up the 
bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Finland concerning the usage of the 
natural resources in the North162.  
 
The Members of the Parliament from Finland and the Soviet Union had a conference in 
Helsinki on April 1988. The topic was The Safety, and Peaceful Means for Cooperation 
in the North, and the event was a result of Gorbachev's speech. The speaker of the 
Parliament of Finland, Matti Ahde, had the opening speech, where he raised the topicality 
of the Arctic areas and the newly risen activity in the issues of international politics among 
the members of the parliament. The environmental issues in the North came to the 
discussion, and the representatives of Finland expressed their concern about the situation 
of air pollution in the Kola Penisula, especially the threat of pollution to Lapland was 
discussed.163 
 
The Kola Peninsula was mentioned only by its environmental problems; however, in the 
1970s and 1980s, the main concern was usually the fact that the Kola Peninsula 
represented one of the Soviet Union’s remarkable military basement areas. There were 
naval ports and a significant number of land-based intercontinental missiles. As being a 
prominent nuclear armament region, it was naturally a security threat as well as an 
environmental risk. But being a crucial target to NATO, the security concern for Finland 
was actual, even though it was easily shimmered behind ecological concerns. 
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Furthermore, this did not fade the fact out that there were real environmental problems as 
well.164    
  
In addition, Kuhmo Summer Academy for Security in the July 1988 discussed issues 
concerning the Arctic and Finland's position widely. The Kuhmo Summer Academy 1988 
was a first public, official discussion about Finland's arctic policies discussed by 
government officials and researchers. The official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Pertti Torstila, was representing Finland's thoughts about the safety and security of the 
Arctic and stressed the need for confidence-building measures. Furthermore, he argued 
that Gorbachev's speech had given possibilities for large-scale international cooperation 
in Arctic issues.165 
 
Researcher Lassi Heininen discussed deeply on an issue if Finland is an Arctic state or 
not. Arguments for and against were the same discussed in this thesis previously: Finland 
does not have an Arctic shoreline, but instead, a big part of Finland locates above the 60 
degrees Northern latitude. Lehtonen argued Finland's arctic nature with a long history in 
the North: Finland had been an Arctic shoreline-nation until 1920, and in the Lapland, 
there had always been Finns or Finland's Saḿi people. Heininen highlighted that even in 
the 1980s, Finland had a strong foothold in the North. He admitted that Finland has 
reacted only in the 1980s to northern security issues, regardless that many other from the 
Arctic Eight was reacted politically to the Northern issues much before.166 
 
Further, Heininen added that Finland had not a particular program for Arctic policy, but 
Finland had awakened to the situation, reacting to the Arctic issues and developing its 
national perspective on northern issues167. Indeed, Finland’s Arctic politics had been 
scattered across different areas of foreign and internal policy, without having been 
previously assembled168. Based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive material, it 
must be admitted that Finland did seriously start to think Arctic issues only after the year 
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1983, likewise Heininen mentioned in the Academy. However, technological cooperation 
was, at least on a small scale, going on already in the 1970s.  Despite this, even after the 
will from 1983 onwards, the actual push to cooperate was mild until the Gorbachev's 
speech.169 
 
Negotiating official Rajakoski and researcher Lassi Heininen had a private conversation 
in September 1988, where Rajakoski described the current situation. Rajakoski 
introduced that Finland was going for peaceful cooperation in the Arctic, and that was 
going to be Finland's new foreign policy framework. Furthermore, Rajakoski said that at 
first, the aim was to start from the academic level, then quickly continue towards 
environmental protection, and then aim towards economic cooperation.  However, 
according to Rajakoski, Finland was aiming a lot further than these mentioned targets: he 
argued that the cooperation should go much further than the Western countries were 
willing to go in the name of the success of the Arctic cooperation.170  Even though 
Rajakoski did not explain with details how far Finland would have wanted to go, the 
message is quite clear, and the statement was reliable: Finland had a vision, targets, and 
Finland wanted an intense cooperation organ. 
 
At the end of October 1988, Arctic Science Committee was developed further, and the 
basic guidelines for the organisation were created. The Committee consisted of 8 member 
states, and it was open for those countries' scientists and individually invited persons. The 
Committee's role was to be an advisory body in scientific questions concerning the 
Arctic.171    
 
However, if the first half of the year 1988 was uneventful, the rest of the year was full of 
meetings, journeys, and negotiations — Finland began journeys with its proposal quite 
precisely one year after the Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk. The tentative journey 
started from the Soviet Union, and the very first proposal trip for the International 
Conference on Arctic Environmental Protection was made in the early days of October. 
Finland introduced the idea of keeping an international environmental conference in 
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Helsinki to the Soviet Union's Environmental Minister Fjodor Morgun. Finland's 
messenger was Minister Kaj Bärlund, and he met Morgun within the meeting of the 
Environmental Ministries in the Kola Peninsula. Minister Morgun's reaction was, 
regarded to Bärlund's memo, surprisingly positive.172  
 
Finland had four reasons why cooperation would be fruitful to the Soviet Union, as well 
to the other Arctic states. Firstly, Finland stressed the deep concern of environmental 
issues, mostly in the sphere of usage of natural resources. Secondly, Finland reminded 
that all the proposals points are just a natural continuation to the Gorbachev's speech in 
Murmansk and that Finland's proposal only answered to the Gorbachev's suggestion of 
multilateral cooperation. Thirdly, Finland argued that the timing was quite right, and 
fourthly, Finland stressed that every nation that had land northern than the Arctic Circle 
had the right to join this new level of cooperation, including the US and Canada. 
Furthermore, the memo reveals that Finland has had consultations within other countries 
about the proposal, and this was let to the Soviet Union's consciousness. However, the 
countries concerned are not identified in the memo.173 Soon after this memo, the MFA 
sent a secret message widely to Finland's highest representatives, for instance, Embassies, 
President Koivisto and Prime Minister Holkeri. In the message, MFA told about its 
intentions to start negotiations with the eight Arctic countries for extensive international 
environmental cooperation in Arctic issues.174  
 
It is not clear if the memo about Bärlund's visit to Kola refers to discussions Finland had 
made about the idea of being invitatory before the visit to the Soviet Union or was memo 
referring to some other non-mentioned discussions during the spring and summer 1988. 
However, if Finland had had discussions with other countries about Finland's proposal 
before discussion with Minister Mogun without documentary, it is, thus, very interesting 
why there are no memos about those. The MFA's archives documents reveal only the 
negotiations after discussion with the Soviet Union's Morgun. 
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In November, the USSR's Directorate's First Secretary, Grigory Rapota, visited Finland. 
The main topic for the visit was the situation of the IASC's establishment, but right away, 
at the beginning of the meeting, Rapota told the Finnish representative, Rajakoski, that 
the most crucial issue was, however, the Finland’s initiative for the cooperation in Arctic 
issues. Rapota told Finland that there was planned to keep two meetings in Leningrad 
about Arctic issues. The first one was a conference open widely for academics about the 
Arctic and the other more small-scale for the Arctic Eight about the establishment of the 
IASC. Rapota told that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union was going to 
follow those two meetings. Rapota was wondering if the Nordic countries had any mutual 
disputes about the IASC. The question surprised Finland, and disputes were denied. In 
turn, Rajakoski told that Finland had had discussions in Ottawa and Washington and that 
the reactions had been cautiously positive. Furthermore, Rajakoski announced that he was 
going to continue discussions and visit Moscow, Copenhagen, and Stockholm. Rajakoski 
continued and said that if the reactions continue to be positive, Finland will write a formal 
invitation with working paper attachment. Moreover, again, Rajakoski explained the 
difference between Finland's aim of keeping the International Conference on Arctic 
Environmental Protection and the IASC by saying that the Conference would only be an 
instrument for a mean to build the final solution, for example, an intergovernmental 
convention for the Arctic issues. Rajakoski stressed that the cooperation organ should be 
political by nature.175 
 
Rajakoski continued Finland's proposal journey in October 1988 to Reykjavik, Iceland, 
where Nordic polar officials and scientists were having a meeting. The meeting was 
arranged for the upcoming IASC. In the meeting, Finland had to explain continuously 
how Finland's proposal was differing from the basis of the IASC. Finland stressed that 
the new proposal aimed to intergovernmental cooperation, which the IASC was not 
seeking. The proposal was only taken for information as the high representatives from 
each county were not participants of the meeting. Finland planned to visit each Nordic 
state separately.176    
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Rajakoski continued to propose Nordic countries, and the next partner was Sweden; 
Rajakoski met Ambassador for the Environment Göte Svensson and Counselor for the 
Embassy Ulf Svensson at New York at the beginning of the November 1988. Both 
Svenssons reacted very positively, Rajakoski argued that the reaction was almost 
overwhelming: Swedes commented that Finland's proposal was a first reasonable answer 
to the Gorbachev's speech. The two Swedish representatives promised to introduce 
Finland's proposal to related officials in Sweden and invited Rajakoski to Sweden to 
introduce ideas further.177  
 
In late November, Ambassador Eva-Christina Mäkeläinen sent a message to Rajakoski, 
where she informed that she had had discussions with Secretary of State for Danish 
Foreign Affairs Otto Möller about Finland's aim to arrange International Conference on 
Arctic Environmental Protection. Möller had argued that the issue was most political in 
Denmark and need further discussions. Therefore, Mäkeläinen had arranged for 
Rajakoski a meeting with Denmark's representatives.178 
 
The meeting between Rajakoski and Danish representatives, included Möller, was held 
at the beginning of December. The meeting gave an impression of a high level of 
commitment to the Finland’s proposal. Denmark highlighted again that the initiative had 
a profound political connotation. Denmark granted support for the initiative but pointed 
out that due to its politically sensitive nature, the issue should proceed with high 
sensitivity.179 
 
In 20.10.1988, the US answered to Finland that it was interested in multilateral 
cooperation, but wanted high-level discussions with Finland before answering 'yes'180. 
Negotiating official Rajakoski visited Washington in 27.10.1988 for to find out the US's 
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reactions for Finland's initiative. This meeting was third after the Nordic states in stock 
and the Soviet Union. Due to the facts of environmental hazards in the Kola Peninsula 
and other areas in the Arctic, the US took the need for cooperation in environmental issues 
very seriously. However, the US wanted cooperation's leading role in the hands of the 
Nordic countries, the US, and Canada, instead of being in the hands of the Soviet Union. 
The US officials argued that 'Finland is on the right track' with its initiative. Furthermore, 
officials said that Finland's initiative had a good chance to succeed.181 One interesting 
point here is that Rajakoski admitted to the US representatives that Finland has its selfish 
ambitions behind the willingness of cooperation; Finland has an urge to protect its nature 
in addition to the generous concern of the global environment.182 This humble approach 
of Finland may have inspired confidence among other negotiating partners.  
 
Canada's representative welcomed the initiative well, and it was considered ideally timed: 
one or two years before the year 1988 that kind of an initiative would not have been even 
thinkable, the rise of the environmental issues had changed the negotiation atmosphere. 
Therefore, according to Canadians, the multilateral forum of the Arctic, when 
concentrated on environmental issues, was possible. The initiative was seen as an 
essential step towards further cooperation, and Canadians promised to answer quickly.183  
 
Furthermore, Canadians saw the multilateral approach as most fruitful with Arctic issues, 
as it had been with the case of the IASC. Canadians strongly emphasised that the Soviet 
Union had to be involved as much as possible, and they saw that the non-military issues 
would help with this. Canadians had recognised the change in the Soviet Union, it was 
oncoming, and Canadians hoped that Finland would push the Soviet move even more 
towards other Arctic nations.184 
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4 Finland in a Hurry 
 
4.1 From Idea to Proposal 
 
After the exploratory discussions, Finland held an extensive meeting at the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs Political Department about the Finland’s initiative. Rajakoski introduced 
the current situation in negotiations: he told about positive reception and the fact that 
political will was in the air. Finland planned that when every country had reacted 
positively to the initiative, then Finland will send a formal invitation. And after the 
commitment of the countries, the plan was that Conference might declare a framework 
convention. Furthermore, for the declaration, the aim was that there could be separate 
records to supplement the declaration. The memo reveals that the initiative had not yet 
been debated in the Parliament of Finland. The working paper was discussed before 
Christmas by the Government and the Committee on Foreign Affairs; the working paper 
was about to send after meeting to the governments of the Arctic Eight.185  
 
Even though, as a whole, the initiative was in the upswing, Finland was concerned about 
choosing the primary approach from two options. The first approach was geographical, 
which would have been good, for instance, dealing with the exploitation of natural 
resources. The second was an impact-based approach, which would have worked well 
with cross-border environmental problems, such as ozone protection. The meeting 
thought that dealing with first would be more comfortable. However, after discussion, the 
meeting stated that approaches were not excluding each other, but decided that the 
questions could be combined. Furthermore, the meeting expressed that if looking at 
problems only from the geographical approach, Finland could be easily played out from 
the cooperation due to the lack of the Arctic shoreline and that the impact-based approach 
suited better for Finland. The meeting closed with a list of topics for sectoral surveys. 
Topics were air protection, marine and river environments, nuclear radiation issues, fauna 
and flora, and forest areas. These surveys were decided to be ready after a few weeks, 
before Christmas, for the next task force meeting.186  
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The meeting in the Political Department continued with a meeting in the MFA's Legal 
Department, where the legal background work for the International Conference on Arctic 
Environmental Protection and its possible Declaration begun. The Legal Department 
went through existing agreements relating to the Arctic, and the aim was to find out where 
the Conference could make openings and progress. After the review of the international 
environmental agreements, the meeting addressed two specific issues: Finland's position 
and the fairness of the initiative. Finland's position caused uncertainty because Finland 
was one of the few without any Arctic sea areas. From environmental issues, topics 
related to long-distance transport were the only ones which touched Finland. The meeting 
was worried that this weakens Finland's ability to include restrictions in the contract 
because those would not have touched Finland. The second concern was fairness: how 
the Conference could avoid a situation where one country feels that all the topics and 
concerns are directed at it. This concern was almost entirely about the Soviet Union, 
where, for example, the questions of forestry and forest protection were the most critical 
topics to solve in the Conference. However, the scientifical information about each 
country's environmental state was incomplete, and therefore the making of the 
conclusions was too early. The information-gathering was considered unusually 
important to achieve equity.187 However, there were no mentions on how to guarantee 
equity if data shows that, for example, the Soviet Union had the most massive burden to 
solve. 
 
The Legal Department discussed the two main approaches, which were the Political 
Department's concerns as well. For the usage of natural resources in the sea areas, the 
geographical approach, the Legal Department saw that there was a wide variety of 
regulations already, and the only question is if the countries was willing to go further than 
the international Law of the Sea goes. Furthermore, the meeting recalled that the division 
of continental shelf and marine areas were almost unsolved in the Arctic areas. For the 
second concern, impact-based approach, the Legal Department saw as the main problem 
that the Arctic area suffered almost identical problems to other parts of the world, for 
example, as regards air pollution and there were already world-wide regulations for those. 
If the convention was seeking more ambitious solutions, they could not do that without 
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taking into account existing agreements. Also, if the target was to negotiate regional limits 
for pollution rates, it must bear in mind, that the Soviet Union was most probably the one 
to bear the most significant burden – how this was planned to deal without fear of the 
Soviet withdrawal from the project?188 
 
As a conclusion, the Legal Department's meeting argued that there was no one size, fits 
all –solutions to the environmental issues of the Arctic. There were many conflicting 
goals and interests, and a number of external boundaries, such as various international 
environmental laws. In addition, there were many disputes in the Arctic about different 
regional areas, which the Legal Department considered unlikely to be resolved in the short 
term. Finally, the meeting suggested that Finland would not seek binding environmental 
standards at the Conference, but would instead focus on taking the initiative to start 
coordinating the gathering of the necessary information.189 
 
After the meetings with the Arctic countries had been mostly positive, and Finland's plan 
was made up, Finland's initiative came to the public. Minister Bärund gave an interview 
at the beginning of December, where he informed that international environmental 
cooperation with Arctic issues had been launched, and the first meeting was planned to 
arrange during summer 1989.190   
 
At the end of November, Rajakoski begun to travel formally with the Finland’s initiative, 
and the first destination was Moscow, where he first met the USSR's Directorate's Head 
of the International Law Department Ju Viktorovich Rybakov with other Department 
officials. Rajakoski started the meeting by stressing the environmental issues and 
presenting the scope of international environmental legislation. Then he moved to the fact 
that despite the full range of regulations, there was a lack of the regulations in the Arctic 
and, and therefore Finland had started to seek subjects that could have been sorted by 
agreement. Rajakoski highlighted that Finland realised the need for the initiative from 
Gorbachev's speech, and Finland's proposal had been modeled straight from the speech 
and Gorbachev's message. Rajakoski explained that the visit to Moscow was part of the 
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consultations with eight Arctic states and introduced the previous meetings, for example, 
in Washington and Ottawa, and the aim was to arrange a conference in where the further 
convention would be formed.191 
 
Rajakoski explained the project in great detail. Rajakoski told that within the framework 
of the Convention, the participating countries could first make their declarations, which 
would be assembled into an umbrella convention. Rajakoski continued that the umbrella 
convention would be followed by the negotiation of protocols on concrete environmental 
protection measures and consideration of monitoring mechanisms. Rajakoski introduced 
Finland's thoughts about the following entities: air protection, protection of marine areas, 
protection of land areas, and protection of flora and fauna. Rajakoski, however, stressed 
that Finland was open for other openings as well, more crucial was, according to 
Rajakoski, that the Convention could get started quickly due to the apparent momentum. 
Rajakoski further stressed that the purpose was to have intergovernmental cooperation as 
opposed to the IASC, although the IASC could support the Convention's work. Finally, 
Rajakoski wished to hear the Soviet's thoughts about Finland's proposal.192 
 
In turn, Rybakov started commenting with a question; he wanted to hear what the US 
State Department had said about Finland's proposal. Rajakoski told that the State 
Department's reception had been surprisingly positive, and they had emphasised the aim 
to have environmental issues as the tip of the idea. Rybakov admitted that environmental 
issues had gained importance in the Soviet Union as well. Rybakov even mentioned that 
environmental issues was the second primary concern after the threat of the nuclear war. 
He reminded that President Gorbachev had stressed that tensions must be eased in the 
Arctic. Rybakov continued that Finland's proposal was the very first of its kind and that 
the Soviet felt sympathy toward Finland's proposal. He admitted that in Finland's 
proposal, there were lots of potentials. The only problem he rose was the question of 
dividing the states' roles in the Conference as well as in the Convention.193 
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In the end, Rajakoski iterated Finland's idea of the course of events: first round of 
consultation would continue, then Finland creates a detailed presentation followed by a 
new round of consultation and finally a conference in the next year. For this, Rybakov 
answered, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that the IASC's role might be problematic, and 
Finland should consider leaving the connection between the IASC and the Convention. 
When Rajakoski inquired the reason, Rybakov told that the Soviet would appreciate more 
if the state and the non-state body were kept separate. Again, Rajakoski stressed the 
intergovernmental character of the proposal and told that naturally, academics could have 
only an assistant role, and decisions would be made within nations. Rybakov maintained 
his position that the two bodies to be established should be separate. Before leaving, 
Rajakoski gave the non-paper to Rybakov.194 
  
Day after the meeting with Rybakov, Rajakoski had a meeting with Deputy Chairman of 
the USSR State Committee on Environmental Protection V.G.Sokolovski with members 
from his staff. Rajakoski started again by explaining the very root of the proposal, similar 
to a day before to Rybakov. Sokolovski was interested in if the Nordic countries, 
especially Denmark, had emphasised new attitudes towards Finland's proposal. Rajakoski 
told that he was not visited there yet during this first consultation round but was going 
soon. Sokolovski said that he had heard Denmark's negative attitudes towards Finland's 
proposal. As an answer to this claim, but in contrast to talks with Rybakov, Rajakoski 
emphasised that Finland's neutral position was essential, making it difficult for other 
countries to take a negative stance on the initiative. Sokolovski opinion was, however, 
that it does not matter who was the one with initiative; more critical was to seize the 
momentum. Nevertheless, he admitted that Finland had more potential for this than the 
Soviet Union; other countries was more willing to cooperate when Finland was the one 
to propose. According to Sokolovski, the Soviet Union was willing to help Finland with 
the initiative; however, the Soviet wanted to be up to date with the consultations with 
other Arctic countries. Before leaving, Rajakoski gave, again, the non-paper to 
Sokolovski.195  
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In December 1988, Rajakoski had a meeting in Oslo with the Head of Department 
Dagfinn Stenseth and Special Adviser Rolf Trolle Andersen. The Finland’s Ambassador 
Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen was, as well, present. Rajakoski introduced the proposal, however, 
shorter than to the Soviet Union. Stenseth asked about the negotiations with other 
countries, Rajakoski introduced the situation in negotiations. Rajakoski estimated that a 
formal invitation was about to send in January 1989. He expressed the wish that countries 
would comment on non-paper before the invitation and gave, as well, one to the 
Norwegians.196 
 
Stenseth argued that Norway was pleased to be able to comment on Finland's initiative: 
the Arctic issues were essential and subjective for Norway. Norway reminded that the 
Soviet Union had not joined to all environmental regulations and treaties. However, to 
make the situation better, Norway and the Soviet Union had started to build bilateral 
cooperation. Stenseth commented that there were few issues related to Finland's initiative, 
as well. Andersen asked Rajakoski to explain initiative's aims more, and Rajakoski told 
that the initiative had three main lines: declarative function, it needed to be useful for 
scientific research, and it had to target to concrete results. Norwegians were quite critical 
towards Finland's initiative. They claimed that it was too high-flying; the issues were too 
complicated, and there was too much duplication with existing or ongoing projects. 
Andersen stressed that there were too many very long-standing controversies, which had 
been on the way before, and there was minimal signs that the situation had changed 
dramatically. For example, Andersen explained the argue about the question of dividing 
the Barents Sea, which was still a frosty issue between Norway and the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, Norwegians asked more time to react and comment on the non-paper. They 
argued that it was too dangerous to proceed too fast; it would only break the goodwill. 
They feared that the excellent start for bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union would 
be under threat due to Finland's proposal. Finally, Andersen added that also the 
regulations and issues in oil industries were essential to Norway, and they were satisfied 
with the current situation and did not want any distractions for that industry.197 
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Whether Norway’s reaction was surprisingly reserved, Denmark, in turn, astounded with 
a positive reaction. Denmark was pleased that environmental protection was the main 
issue and requested to be sensitive due to the tensions that the Arctic region raises, 
especially among the two superpowers. However, Denmark saw that the détente was in a 
good position towards far-reaching cooperation, and Denmark hoped that this would 
promote dialogue. Unlike other countries, Denmark asked if the countries outside of the 
Arctic eight could be along in cooperation. Rajakoski argued that more extensive 
cooperation could be possible, especially among European countries.198  
 
Rajakoski wrote a memo to a broad and high-level audience, for instance, to Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, about the status of Finland's initiative just before 1988's Christmas. 
Rajakoski introduced all means that had been done during the autumn for Finland's 
initiative. He continued and explained country by country what kind of response Finland's 
initiative had received. The Soviet Union's reactions had been unlimitedly positive, 
Denmark cautiously positive, Sweden was ready to support the initiative, only waiting 
for the main substances, and, for Rajakoski's surprise, Norway had taken a cautious 
attitude.199 
 
The MFA started the year 1989 with a meeting, where the current situation in Finland's 
Arctic initiative was throughout discussed. Rajakoski told that the initiative was meant to 
introduce to President Koivisto on 13th January, and right away after the meeting with 
the President, the press briefing was held. The parliamentary Foreign Affairs committee 
was getting informed afterward. It was decided to exclude the fishing issue from the 
invitation's agenda. Otherwise, the agenda was kept as planned before. The next 
consultative round was planned to arrange in March and April 1989. Consultations were 
hoped to have deep substance. After consultations, a preparatory meeting of experts 
would be arranged, and the estimated timing would be the autumn of 1989. What comes 
to the actual Conference, the place was planned to be Rovaniemi.200  
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The meeting continued with a press release, where Finland's acts towards Arctic 
cooperation were told to the public. Finland's government impressed deep concern for 
environmental problems in the Arctic and said that means for environmental protection 
should be started immediately. Due to these environmental threats, Finland was going to 
propose Arctic countries for a multilateral conference that would aim to negotiate 
solutions and conventional means to protect the Arctic environment. Simultaneously, the 
Ministry of the Environment and Minister Bärlund gave a statement, where they 
highlighted that because there was no environmental protection cooperation in the Arctic, 
Finland's initiative was much needed.  Bärlund continued that there was also a lack of 
research data and assessment methods, and those were mainly needed to study further the 
state of the Arctic Ocean. A few months later, in March, Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio 
stated alike about the importance of environmental protection in the Arctic. He also 
argued as a very north country, Finland should carry responsibility for the cooperation.201 
 
 
4.2 The Post-Invitation Consensus 
 
The official invitation was sent to seven other Arctic country's embassies of Finland on 
12th January 1989. The invitations were transferred via Finland's representatives to the 
authorities of countries concerned.202 The invitation was signed by Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Kalevi Sorsa and Minister of the Environment Kaj Bärlund, and it included a 
working paper on the subject. The invitation and idea were justified by the rapid 
deterioration of the environment in the Arctic region and the fact that Arctic countries 
had the primary responsibility to solve the problems of protecting the Arctic nature. 
Finland explained the consulting round made in late 1988 and that the response had been 
'extremely encouraging.' Therefore, Finland had decided to suggest a Conference on the 
Protection of the Environment of the Arctic in Helsinki.203  
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The working paper attached to the invitation had four pages and had seven topics. Firstly, 
Finland wrote about the Arctic fragile ecosystem, secondly about the threats to the 
environment, for instance, climate change, pollution of the marine environment, and 
exploitation of living and non-renewable resources. Thirdly, Finland stressed that 
adequate environmental protection needed intergovernmental cooperation, scientific 
research, and monitoring of the ecosystem of the Arctic region. Fourthly, Finland listed 
global and regional conventions, agreements of protection Arctic Wildlife, and 
agreements regulating fisheries, which all, according to Finland, were essential to take 
consider. Fifthly, Finland wrote its statement of the importance of initiating an 
intergovernmental process that should lead to a declaration, convention, or other 
multilateral arrangements. Sixthly, Finland proposed more straightforwardly that all 
Arctic eight nations should take action, and it should not contradict the prevailing 
agreements. Furthermore, the action was not allowed to jeopardise possible ongoing 
negotiations. Seventhly and lastly, Finland introduced the idea to arrange the Conference 
on the Protection of the Arctic Environment and that it was planned to be held soon. 
Before that, Finland hoped to discuss working paper with countries involved, and Finland 
explained that the invitation and working paper were sent to Canada, Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, and the US. Finland welcomed all opinions to the 
matter proposed.204  
 
Since Finland's representatives went the invitations personally, they got preliminary 
reactions comments right way. In Washington, Jaakko Laajava handed over the invitation 
to Edwar J. Wolfe, who argued that the US was supportive in principle, and the 
enthusiasm toward Finland's initiative has been growing as time and knowledge had 
grown. He did not feel able to comment topic further but promised to return to the issue 
after discussions between the US authorities had done. The US said that they were 
interested to hear what other countries were going to comment on, especially the Soviet 
Union's opinion was an urgent matter.205 
 
In Moscow, Finland's invitation received Sergei Zhuravljov, who was interested to hear 
if Finland had already a more specific idea about the timing of the Conference or was this 
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dependent on the reactions of the other countries. Furthermore, he asked if Finland was 
waiting for concrete and official answers to the working paper. Finland's answer, nor the 
person who was transferring the invitation, was not mentioned in the MFA's archive's 
document. Any other reactions were not mentioned, which is understandable since 
Zhuravljov stressed the informal nature of the discussion.206 
 
Reykjavik was overwhelmingly positive towards invitation, and they had already 
established a particular group of politicians and academics concerning questions on the 
Arctic environment. Further, Reykjavik promised quite soon to have a meeting with this 
group, then they will inform Finland their official statement.207 Norway was, however, a 
much more restrained. Stoltenberg commented that Finland's proposal was concerning 
susceptible issues, and therefore Norway needed time to concern official answers to 
Finland's working paper.208 Canada became aware of the Norwegian's hesitation and 
raised this when they commented on their thoughts about the invitation. Canadians kept 
a more specific timeline necessary because open situation caused uncertainty to another 
bi- and multilateral negotiations.209   
 
Canadian Science Advisor Fred Roots were asked to comment on Finland's working paper 
to Canadian Environmental Advisory Council, and Roots informally told Finland how he 
had said. Roots argued that his main message was that Finland's initiative was not “a 
hasty or impulsive one, but has a consistent history and careful preparation.” Roots 
continued 
“In 1987, when it appeared for a while that the Soviet Union might push 
hard for the future committee to include only states touching the Arctic 
Ocean, Finland reacted strongly. The Finnish Ambassador to Canada came 
to see me in my office, and also spoke to Mr. Clark, and made strong 
statements about Finland’s concern, and right, to be involved in 
circumpolar environmental affairs. Finland took the lead and supported by 
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Sweden and Iceland, got agreement from the ´arctic rim five´ that 
International arctic matters should henceforth become the ´Arctic 8´.”210 
 
There are three remarks to do: Firstly, Canadians had made openings for the Arctic 
cooperation, but regarded to Roots, Canada was handing over the leading role to Finland. 
Secondly, Roots admitted that Finland held a strong position in the Arctic issues. Thirdly, 
Finland's long-term work with consulting rounds was seen as the right way to deal with 
this nascent cooperation. 
 
French Embassy's temporary secretary Bertrand Lavezzari informally came to visit MFA 
because of the uncertainties of Finland's initiative. The memo reveals that other countries 
than Arctic Eight were dependent only on Finland's press release. Lavezzari was 
especially interested in how Finland's initiative differs from the IASC, how the Arctic 
countries were defined and were other countries possible to join to the cooperation. 
Counselor Risto Rautiainen answered to Lavezzari that the IASC was a separate organ 
from Finland's initiative and that the Arctic countries were defined with the Arctic Circle 
– a country which had land northern than the Arctic Circle was included. Rautiainen 
answered that other countries than the Arctic Eight were at least that point not taken into 
the cooperation. Lavezzari was amazed that the Arctic Eight was trying to solve world-
wide environmental problems since pollution and other environmental problems were not 
following nations' or regions' borders. Lavezzari wondered if a separate organ was needed 
since the cooperation in the Arctic could have been arranged similar to the Antarctic. 
Rautiainen explained that the situation was quite different because the Antarctic was a 
continent, and the Arctic was mostly ice and sea. Furthermore, Rautiainen argued that the 
Antarctic did not belong to any nation-states, and the Arctic, instead, belonged mostly to 
the Arctic Eight countries. Lastly, Lavezzari asked if other than environmental issues 
were going to rise to discussion, for example, issues concerning military strategy, and 
was the initiative under Finland's MFA or Ministry of Environment of Finland. 
Rautiainen answered that the Conference was concentrating only on environmental 
questions, and those two ministry's asked were both involved in the Conference. 211 
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At the end of January, the MFA got a telegram from Finland's embassy in Ottawa, where 
they had heard from Clark, that Canada was concerned about how to react to two non-
Arctic states, that had been asking if they could have joined to the Arctic cooperation. 
The two non-Arctic states were not named in the telegram.212 Furthermore, in the last 
days of January, Finland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sorsa, got a letter from Norway's 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jens Stoltenberg, which included positive sound from 
Norway to Finland's initiative. Norway was slightly worried still about how the prevailed 
bi- and transnational agreements were going to put together with the new initiative. 
Otherwise, the Norwegians were positive and promised to send their comments to 
Finland's working paper after careful preparation.213 This positive sound was a little 
surprise since the official statements to Finland's MFA had been cautious. 
 
In fact, still in February 1989, Rajakoski visited Norway and reported the current situation 
and the working paper. Rajakoski introduced the plan: the first preparatory meeting was 
planned to keep before the summer and the ministerial Conference during autumn 1989. 
Norway reminded Finland that it had significant national interests, and therefore they 
wanted to exact substance and to have enough time for the commentary. The message 
was quite similar to the previous meeting in December 1988. Norwegians thought that 
the timetable was still too tight, taking into account the ambitious target. Finally, 
Norwegians wished that the IASC would be separate organ from Finland's proposal's 
convention.214 
 
February 1989 was a busy month to the MFA when invited countries were sending their 
answers. Furthermore, Finland had inquiries and visits from non-member countries and 
associations. Moreover, Rajakoski had a journey to the US, Alaska, and Canada. At first, 
Finland heard that even though Sweden was mostly welcoming Finland's initiative 
positively, the scientific field was, however, slightly skeptical of Finland's idea. This 
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hesitating, according to Swedish Polar Ambassador Göte Svensson, was only stemming 
from the fear that the next cooperation organ would step to their academic field.215 
 
When Canadians were concerned about the two non-Arctic states' interest to join Arctic 
cooperation, they might have meant previously in MFA visited France and Great Britain, 
which sent Ambassador Justin Stables to visit Rajakoski at 1.2.1989. Stables conveyed 
the upheaval message since it was difficult for Britain to understand why they were 
excluded from the “Arctic Club” even though the British had, among other things, 
invested heavily in Arctic research. Rajakoski did not deny that the Arctic problems affect 
a much broader amount of nations than just the Arctic eight. Nevertheless, Rajakoski 
continued that the Arctic Eight was, however, mostly responsible for the condition in the 
Arctic, and therefore, at least in the beginning, the Arctic countries were going to establish 
the cooperation organ. Rajakoski tried to invoke the newly established scientific 
cooperation, the IASC, where all affected countries were welcomed. In the end, Rajakoski 
permitted Staples that he was allowed to tell the situation to the other members of the 
European Community.216 
 
Two organisations contacted the MFA as well in addition to two non-Arctic countries. At 
first, the International Juridical Organisation was proposing to be informed about the 
Conference and the actions to come after the Conference's decisions217. Secondly, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation, Unesco, sent a letter, 
where Unesco emphasised willingness to collaborate with new means to protect the Arctic 
environment. Many of Finland's working paper issues were included in Unesco's program 
activities.218  
 
Canadian authorities, Ambassador Mary Vanderhoff and a polar official Peter Burnet, 
visited Rajakoski at the beginning of February. Burnet told that he had visited the Soviet 
Union, and the Soviet's attitude was favorable towards Finland's initiative. Rajakoski 
thanked Canadians for a positive attitude for Finland’s initiative and told that Norwegians 
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had also moved more to the positive side for the initiative and were at least interested. 
Rajakoski told that Norwegians were worried about the political aspects of the initiative, 
but Finland promised that it was going to focus only on environmental issues. Denmark 
had some hesitations, as well, because of Greenland, Rajakoski continued and told that 
the Soviet Union was keen on the operative aspects of the initiative. Canadians were still 
doubtful if the right amount of countries were invited, and Rajakoski answered that he 
had had negotiations with non-Arctic states, but because the primary responsibility for 
the Arctic problems was with the Arctic Eight, they should be the primary members. 
However, Rajakoski flashed the idea of observers due to the high interest shown. 
Rajakoski told that the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, and France had been 
interested in joining or follow Finland’s initiative. Burnet told that Canada was not 
supporting the limitations of participant countries. Rajakoski answered and concluded 
that the Soviet Union was strictly behind the eight member states.219 
 
The question of non-Arctic participants raised repeatedly; the next questioner was 
Iceland, from whom Great Britain had asked their opinion if they participate as an 
observer. Iceland had heard that the Federal Republic of Germany was, as well, interested. 
However, Iceland had another message, as well; they had answered ‘yes’ to Finland’s 
initiative and were looking forward to upcoming events, a preparatory meeting of officials 
as well as the Conference.220 Furthermore, the unreserved consent of Sweden followed 
the consent of Iceland221. 
 
At the beginning of March, Denmark inquired how other Arctic countries had responded 
to Finland’s initiative. Finland told Denmark that reactions had been decisive in principle, 
some had responded very positively. Greenland’s consult Finn Lynge informed Finland’s 
Ambassador Mäkeläinen that he had noticed that the attitude of Canadians had turned 
positive after the change of US President. Under Ronald Reagan, the attitude of Canadians 
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had been more reserved than it was under George H. W. Bush. However, the official 
agreement gave another wait.222  
 
Rajakoski made a journey to The True North Strong and Free Conference to Canada in 
the middle of March. Rajakoski had a presentation listened to by 1300 listeners.223 In his 
speaking notes, Rajakoski dealt with factors affecting the cooperation in the Arctic. At 
first, Rajakoski wrote about the military situation, which is interesting, because there had 
been a minimal amount of military issues throughout the negotiations about Finland’s 
initiative. Rajakoski explained that military activities had been and was still affecting 
negatively to the possibilities of cooperating in the field of environment. However, 
Rajakoski stressed that the new situation with less tension in East-West relations had 
made it possible to negotiate environmental cooperation, but, as well, disarmament. In 
this topic, Rajakoski concluded that military factor, unfortunately, remains, at least to 
some extent, and affects negatively to every aspect of cooperation in the Arctic Region.224 
 
Secondly, Rajakoski noted that the network of bilateral or other agreements and treaties 
concerning the Arctic area was too confusing and that cooperation was much needed in 
this area. Thirdly, Rajakoski wrote that the exploitation of natural resources was growing, 
and sooner or later, it was needing forcing factors to protect the environment. Fourthly, 
Rajakoski highlighted the IASC and the possibility to use it as a supportive factor to the 
Conference and future cooperation. With these four points, Rajakoski wanted to explain 
the apparent need for cooperation, which had been lacking because of the military 
tensions in the region. Rajakoski concluded that the time was suitable, momentum was 
there; scientifical cooperation had already begun, and countries had been discussing with 
each other about these, previously too sensitive, issues.225  
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In addition to the Conference in Edmonton, Rajakoski visited several oil companies and 
Canadian state representatives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada. Rajakoski 
met academics, as well. Furthermore, Rajakoski visited Alaska in the US and visited the 
US Arctic Research Commission. In there, Rajakoski heard that lack of information from 
other countries limited research activity. In Alaska Rajakoski found out that the Alaskans 
were definitely behind the Finland’s initiative. During Rajakoski’s journey, Finland’s 
initiative received widespread media attention. 226  In addition, in discussions with 
representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada, it began apparent that the 
non-Arctic countries should argued by Canadians, be involved at a later stage, but only 
eight Arctic countries should swiftly initiate the launch itself.227 
 
When summing up the journey to Finland’s high representatives, for instance to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rajakoski wrote that during the trip in the North America’s 
Arctic areas he had realised how big, or even giant, task Finland had taken over. He 
continued that humankind was at the forefront of huge, ever-growing nature conservation 
issues, when similarly meeting the growing energy demand increasingly require invading 
in the Arctic.228 
 
Right after Rajakoski’s journey to Canada and Alaska, the US sent a note about joining 
Finland’s initiative. However, the US was not unconditional; the US wanted that the 
discussion of environmental pollution, sources, or problems should be open to all parties, 
including non-Arctic countries.229 Canadians had heard one concerned country more, 
Netherlands230. This was the first definite distinguishing factor between the superpowers 
during the negotiations of Finland's initiative, and the message was similar to Canadians 
had, as well, emphasised. 
  
Eight days later came the Soviet Union’s response. The Soviet Union agreed with 
Finland’s views of the state of the Arctic environment. The Soviet Union reminded in its 
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response that the first one to suggest cooperation in the Arctic with environmental issues 
was the Soviet Union, and kept Finland’s initiative as a natural continuation to the 
Gorbachev’s proposal. Furthermore, the Soviet Union agreed that eight Arctic states 
should take responsibility for the Arctic areas. The Soviet Union was coming to join the 
initiative with high activity.231  
 
Rajakoski suggested in a letter further action to Minister of Foreign Affairs Paasio and 
Finland’s foreign policy officers in April 1989, when the tailwind of Finland’s initiative 
was visible. Rajakoski's idea was to start with a preparatory ministerial meeting where 
the needs and problems in the Arctic of each country would be discussed. The final 
document should be drafted almost to a final phase at the preparatory meeting. Rajakoski 
continued that the aim of Finland’s initiative should be to establish a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for environmental protection. The regime should cover, firstly, 
conventions, and other international legal arrangements, and, secondly, new agreements 
or other Arctic-related arrangements. Thirdly, Rajakoski summed, all existing Arctic 
treaties should be enforced in all Arctic countries. In the preparatory meeting, the 
substance areas planned by Finland should be divided among the countries in order to 
reduce the burden on Finland. Rajakoski concluded his memo by stating that, with such 
contractual arrangements, a permanent organisation could not be avoided.232 
 
Rajakoski travelled to the Soviet Union to discussed about the situation with Finland’s 
initiative and he began the meeting by emphasising the great importance of Gorbachev 
regarding the new-born cooperation in Arctic issues, as well as in the progress of détente. 
In turn, Zhulravljov argued that President Koivisto made the first steps to cooperation 
when he popped the issue of security in the Arctic area in 1986 up. After the pleasantries, 
Zhuravljov commented that the Soviet Union was mostly interested in military-political 
issues in the Arctic, but at almost the same level were environmental issues. Rajakoski 
and Zhuravljov compared Finland’s initiative to the OSCE and considered it as a mini-
OSCE; at the time, confidence-building also contributed to the alleviation of the armed 
situation, and a similar passage was hoped in the Arctic. Thus, the military-political 
questions did not have to be high on the agenda, but they eventually will come to a 
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discussion on time when the debate on other issues had built mutual trust between all 
parties. Zhuravljov closed the meeting by stating Finland to be always on the right track 
and using it well for building a path where everyone can journey even with most tense 
issues to the peaceful conclusion. He repeated the official state statement that the Soviet 
Union seeks to contribute to its progress.233 
 
Otherwise, during April, Norway was going to negotiate bilaterally about environmental 
issues with the Soviet Union234. Norway was still hesitating whether to be positive or not 
to Finland’s initiative; the threshold issue was the status of the continental shelf between 
Norway’s Svalbard and the Norwegian mainland. Status negotiations were still ongoing, 
and the situation remained unresolved, and so the Norwegians feared that Finland’s 
initiative would harm Norway within the issue, as well, the issue of using natural 
resources in Svalbard. Norway was waiting for more detailed information from Finland’s 
plans for the Arctic cooperation to be able to comment on it.235 Further, in April, Canada 
visited Finland’s Embassy in Ottawa and expressed that Canada was willing to assist 
Finland in the preparation of the documents for the preparatory meeting and hoped it 
could start immediately. According to the telegram, Canada's enthusiasm was explained 
by the fact that Canada itself had been striving to organise the initiative, but was adapting 
to the realisation of Finland’s initiative.236 
 
Denmark’s official consent arrived in mid-May. Denmark waited from the cooperation 
discussions in more detail about the framework how adequately tackle the challenges of 
environmental degradation in different parts of the Arctic. Denmark did not have any 
threshold questions or limitations in their agreement.237 
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4.3 The Consensus Melts: The Question of the Nature of The Preparatory Meeting 
 
Finland decided to apply to the European Council on April 1989, and during May, 
Finland's application was approved. Furthermore, during 1989, especially in the summer, 
Finland negotiated simultaneously for Arctic cooperation and more intense integration to 
the European free-trade area. Finland had been a full member of the European Free Trade 
Association from 1986, and during the 1989 negotiations for extending EFTA to the 
whole region of the European Community were running feverishly. President Koivisto 
saw this development as essential and linked to Finland’s plans to join eventually to the 
European Economic Area. This development was a direct result of the Soviet Union; the 
East-trade between Finland and the Soviet Union had decreased heavily. Finland was 
forced to seek partners and new trade ways from the West.238  
 
Similarly, when the high-level of Finland’s foreign policy was in a hurry for new 
economic and integrational openings to West, for the process of the Arctic cooperation, 
Finland sketched non-paper for the note to invite the Arctic Eight to Preparatory Meeting 
in Rovaniemi during spring 1989 behind diplomatic letters and meetings. The second and 
final non-paper before the note sent was ready at the end of May. Finland’s ambassadors' 
correspondence reveals that Canadians had sent a letter to influence the non-paper; 
Canadians wanted as one topic to take into deep consideration the Arctic indigenous 
population.239 After consideration, the topic “the indigenous peoples” was added as a 
seventh point to non-paper. The other topics for discussion were: 1. the air, 2. the seas, 3. 
the land and forests, 4. the radioactive contamination, 5. the lakes, rivers and water 
courses and 6. flora, fauna, the accumulation of contaminants in the Arctic food chain. In 
conclusion, the non-paper included a deep emphasising on the crucial role of the 
Preparatory meeting due to the aim of creating the final results of the Arctic Conference 
on ministerial level. In the last lines of the text, Finland warmly invited the Meeting in 
Rovaniemi, the participating countries, academics, members of regional governments, 
indigenous people as well as academics, and followers from non-Arctic countries. Finland 
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requested non-paper responses by June 25th.240  The note included non-paper and an 
invitation to Rovaniemi and was sent on 13th June. The Preparatory meeting was 
summoned to be held on 14th – 22nd August in 1989.241 
 
The first reactions came quickly, and a positive response, according to Finland’s 
representatives, was received from all eight invited countries as early as 22nd June. The 
meeting’s participants were expected to be ambassadors and heads of departments.242 
Denmark hoped to hear further information about other countries' reactions243, as well as 
the Soviet Union244. Norway was delighted to notice that between lines of the non-paper, 
there was a hint for the Soviet Union to join more international agreements245. The 
paragraph in non-paper stated 
“The environmental protection of the Arctic region is already covered by a 
number of global, regional and bilateral agreements. As the region is 
particularly vulnerable, the existing arrangements are, however, not 
sufficient.”246 
 
Additionally, Canadians said they were already waiting for the invitation and were happy 
about it. Canada desired to bring to the meeting their papers they had in preparation and 
asked if that was allowed to do.247 Finland responded that papers and documents from all 
participating countries were welcome248. Differing from others, the US had a critical tone 
in its response; the US stated that the timetable was far too tight, and the US was 
wondering if Finland had informed other participants more than the US. The US still 
wanted to make sure that non-Arctic countries were welcome to the Preparatory Meeting. 
The US said that they will answer to the note after deeper reading.249  
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Consequently, the US continued with a firm and precise grip and pointed out sternly that 
Finland had misunderstood the US answer; the US had not responded ‘yes’ to Finland's 
invitation, even though Finland was so announced to the Arctic Eight. However, the factor 
behind this upset message and announcement was, at least to some extent, Finland’s fault, 
because Finland had not answered to the US previous questions sent on March and June 
about the cooperation. The US stated that they were still doubtful to answer in the 
affirmative, as Finland’s background paper had not yet been distributed to the 
participating countries. Furthermore, the US said that if the preparation time were not 
going to change, the US threatened that they were sending only an observer to the 
Preparatory Meeting. Moreover, the US required that non-Arctic countries would be 
invited as participants, especially the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. 
Otherwise, if Finland’s government was against the US viewpoint, the US was going to 
negotiate with other participants. As a conclusion, the US presented that Finland moved 
the date half a year forward and asked Finland to inform other participants that the US 
had not yet said yes.250 
 
Finland naturally reacted quickly to the US unexpected statement. Finland did not hide 
its amazement and commented that the situation was shocking because, from the end of 
1988 onwards, the attitude of the US had been very positive towards Finland’s initiative. 
Finland tried to argue that the Preparatory Meeting was planned to start from point zero, 
whereby the background material had only a little importance. Similarly, the role of other 
non-Arctic countries was to be agreed at the preliminary meeting. The tone of the 
instructional message from Finland to Finland’s Embassy in Washington was slightly 
ironic, and Finland was seemingly annoyed. However, Finland suggested a later date, but 
only a month later.251 
 
As a result of Finland’s reaction, the US promised to consider the new date. It seemed 
that the lack of time was not the main issue but instead the uncertainty about the goal. 
Furthermore, the US wanted to know if there was possible to leave from the initiative if 
the Preparatory Meeting feels inappropriate; the US did not want to commit to a project 
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without exit opportunities.252 This fear of no retreat seems a bit special when it comes to 
being one of the world's superpowers. However, the US strict attitude forced Finland to 
answer to question: what were questions which were particularly special for Finland and 
which were not covered in other forums. From the point of the US, the aim and nature of 
the Preparatory Meeting had to be precisely known to send the right kind of delegation to 
the event.253 
 
Finland sent answers to the US, but the answer to the question that what were the crucial 
questions to Finland, there were no exact answer, only description of the state of the 
Arctic environment and a statement that the “efficient management, use and protection of 
the environment requires extensive international cooperation.” For the other question, 
Finland stressed that attending to the Preparatory Meeting did not imply a commitment 
to follow-up.254 
 
Eventually, Finland sent a telegram to the Arctic Eight on 7th July, where the situation 
was open to all participants; Finland told that the hesitating attitude of the US had forced 
to move the Preparatory Meeting and the new timing was 20th – 28th September 1989.255 
Reactions were positive; for example, the Soviet Union was delighted about the extra 
time and stated that it does not intend to oppose the proposal256. After the telegram about 
the changed date, Finland sent the background information to all on 13th July 257 . 
However, even after the work made for the US, Washington sent a telegram that the US 
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was not sure about yes and wanted to negotiate about Finland’s new proposal in the State 
Department258.  
 
At the end of July, Finland sent a telegram to the Arctic Eight, where Finland inquired 
about the size and status of the delegations. In the process, Finland was informing the 
overall situation of the preparations for the meeting. The US was still unsure. However, 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) had expressed its wish to 
be an observatory, and this was supported by the fact that all countries were members of 
the ECE. Furthermore, the ECE asked to submit its working paper to the conference.259  
Sweden, Canada and Iceland commented positively for the ECE’s role, Norway was more 
cautiously; Norway’s opinion was that the Arctic Eight negotiate other participants’ roles 
during the Preparatory Meeting260. The Soviet Union was also allowing the ECE to join; 
however, the Soviet Union wanted to ensure that other than the Arctic Eight were 
observers and not otherwise attending to work of the meeting261. 
 
Day after Finland’s telegram, the Soviet Union asked for moving the Preparatory meeting 
to the beginning of October, no reason was mentioned262. A few days later, the Soviets 
repeated their wish to move the Meeting, but with comment that they will participate if 
the days were suitable for others. The Soviet Union continued that they were waiting for 
the US and Denmark’s answers. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was, again, asking if the 
aim was to prepare a political document.263  
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Similar doubts than the Soviet Union had, had the US as well. At the beginning of August 
came apparent that the US was only sending an observer to the Preparatory Meeting in 
Rovaniemi: The US reported that it was still unclear what the engagement would be by 
joining the Meeting. The other official reasoning was a doubt about the meaningfulness 
of a separate regime based on environmental issues; the US wanted all interested and 
affected countries -principle rather than an exclusive Arctic club. Furthermore, the US 
stressed the importance and priority of existing agreements over the new cooperation. 
However, to conclude, the US agreed that it was interested in following the continuation 
of Finland’s initiative and was not strictly against it, only was monitoring the situation 
with caution.264 Right after the US answer, Denmark sent a telegram where participation 
was confirmed. Denmark was interested in the Soviet Union’s comments about Finland’s 
initiative.265 Finland decided to keep the Preparatory Meeting in September, even though 
Finland regretted the US reluctance266. 
 
Nevertheless, if the other seven Arctic states were unsure about the agenda and level of 
the Preparatory Meeting, the memo from the Foreign Ministry meeting was in the same 
direction; Finland had not decided Finland’s delegation for the Meeting and the Ministry 
of Environment’s and Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ officials were clearly uncertain about 
the ultimate purpose of the meeting. Furthermore, Finland’s officials, like the other Arctic 
states, complained about the timetable being set too rapid.  Officials proposed to modify 
both the agenda and the timetable of the meeting. Rajakoski and Blomberg, however, 
convinced others that the transfer was not worthwhile because the US had other reasons 
than the schedule as well, and participation would still be uncertain in the future. What 
came to the agenda, Rajakoski said that it was only a proposal. However, as a conclusion, 
the meeting decided to modify the agenda slightly to the direction where it would be 
accessible to the US to join at any stage; it was not purposeful to made agenda sound as 
everything had been decided beforehand and without high-level participant, it was 
impossible to join afterward.267 Consequently, Finland made a supplemented draft agenda 
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where the nature of cooperation, as well as the target level of the meeting, had been left 
out. The profile of the meeting was consciously decided lower slightly. Within own 
ambassadors, Finland speculated that might come a need for several preparatory meetings 
before the ministerial Conference.268 
 
However, when the supplemented draft agenda was ready, Rajakoski made a call to the 
US and Canada, before sending it more widely. Rajakoski explained Finland’s thoughts, 
again, throughout to Assistant Secretary of States Frederick Bernthal. Rajakoski 
especially stressed that the participation in this meeting did not automatically bind to any 
follow-up or attendance at the ministerial meeting. After Rajakoski’s explanations, 
Bernthal promised to retake the issue to the discussion, and he promised to try his best to 
get the US to join with a high-level delegation, like the other participating countries.269 
In his call to Canada, Rajakoski heard Canadians worry about the US attitude towards the 
meeting. Canada promised to have bilateral conversations about the meeting and try sure 
the US to join the meeting with the delegation.270 
 
After Rajakoski’s success phone calls to North America, Finland made a press release 
and sent the supplemented draft agenda to the Arctic states. In a press release about the 
Draft Agenda, the main goal was said to be 
“It is hoped that at the Rovaniemi meeting a common political 
understanding on the urgent necessity of international cooperation in the 
protection of the Arctic environment will be reached. -- the first task would 
be on one hand an overview of the environmental problems in the Arctic 
and on the other consideration of the existing cooperation and treaty 
arrangements having an impact on the Arctic environment.”271 
 
Furthermore, about the future and third participants the press release told 
“Among the possibilities of future cooperation are a negotiation process 
leading towards a high level conference and a Final Act adopted by it -- or 
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some other form of cooperation for the protection of the Arctic environment 
decided upon at the meeting. -- One of the main topics at the Rovaniemi 
meeting will thus be, which countries and organisations and in which form 
would take part in the future process of cooperation--.”272 
 
After this press release, Rajakoski instructed Finland’s ambassadors and officials that if 
the question about non-Arctic participants occurs, should answer be that that question 
was meant to discuss in September in the Rovaniemi meeting. Rajakoski wrote that 
Canada and the Soviet Union were strictly against third parties when the US wanted non-
Arctic states as fast as possible along. Finland itself had an open mind to this question 
and was not against the participant of the non-Arctic states or NGOs. 273 
 
After consultation with the US about supplemented draft agenda, the press release, and 
briefing, the US was once again on their toes. The US had not liked the way how Finland 
had impressed itself in the briefing. Finland had, according to the US, said that in the 
Rovaniemi meeting, every country should participate with a level of decision-making due 
to the possibility to enclose a political paper. That was a complicated issue because 
Finland had let the US understand before the press briefing that the meeting was informal 
preparatory by nature. Secondly, Finland had given a strong expression that follow-ups 
are planned to be very soon after the meeting in the Rovaniemi. The US complained that 
the statement was inconsistent with the fact that the end might be that there are no follow-
ups at all.274 
 
The sensitive situation with the US made preparations for the meeting more complicated: 
the issue of the presidium made Canadians cautious. Finland suggested that Rajakoski 
would be the first chairman; the second chairman position would be divided into two: to 
the Soviet Union and Canada. Furthermore, the first committee chairman position was 
suggested to Canada’s John Beesley, and the chairman for the second committee was 
planned to be the Soviet Union’s position. The suggestion was, however, hard decision 
for Canada; they thought that the US would not like it if Canadians took a significant role 
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in the meeting and suggested if Canada would have the Soviet Union’s position instead 
of the prime place.275 
 
Simultaneously with Finland’s struggle times with the arrangements, during summer 
1989, Kuhmo Academy was again arranged. Tapani Vaahtoranta was discussing the 
theme of national security and environmental protection and if they were possible to 
synchronise. He aptly claimed that there was a massive discrepancy between the structure 
of the international system and environmental protection: the environment did not follow 
the borders of the nation-states, and therefore the standard system does not support the 
environment's need.  Vaahtovaara leaned to Bruntland's276 report, where it was stated that 
the nation-states could never be enough to handle environmental issues, not even when 
they were in extensive cooperation. The deficiency was because nation-states have, after 
all, always their benefits that matter the most. However, Vaahtovaara wrote that in the 
1970s and 1980s, there had been good wind: two international environmental treaties 
were established.  Successful treaties mentioned here were the Agreement on the 
Conservation of the Polar Bear in 1976, the Agreement concerning Cooperation in 
Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in 1989.277.  
 
The most exciting aspect of the Kuhmo Academy 1989 is that there were almost none 
mentions about Finland's initiative, even though it was at that point in public, and the first 
exploratory meeting had been in June 1989. For example, Leo Voronkov did not mention 
Finland's initiative at all, even though he wrote about cooperation projects in the Arctic. 
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He, however, mainly wrote about disarmament and not from an environmental aspect, but 
it tells the signal that Finland's initiative was not thought any other way than 
environmental. This is interesting, due to that the in the same publishing, the Vaahtovaara 
claimed that security issues could not be separated from environmental aspects. Only 
Alexei Roginko, when wrote about cooperation among environmental issues, mentioned 
Finland’s' initiative as a potential opening.278  
 
 
4.4 Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment in 
Rovaniemi  
 
 
Finally, the Consultative Meeting in Rovaniemi begun on 20th September 1989 in 
Rovaniemi. After the trouble with the chairman board, eventually, Rajakoski worked as 
the main chairman, and Beesley from Canada and Desiree Edmar from Sweden were 
chosen for vice-chairmen.279  No explanations are found from the documents for the 
reason why the Soviet Union did not have a seat. 
In their opening speeches, the Arctic countries were mostly optimistic and positive for 
Finlands Initiative; however, the US was neutral and only described acts for the Arctic 
that the US had solemnly made. Nevertheless, the US did not have any critical points 
toward Finland’s initiative, either. Already on the first day, it came apparent that most of 
the countries' opinion was that since the environmental harm in the Arctic was not only a 
result from the acts of the Arctic Eight, the other countries should be committed to the 
cooperation as soon as possible.280 
 
Sweden expressed that the Arctic cooperation was needed, but it could be done within 
already existing organs. Sweden stressed the role of the ECE and used it as an excellent 
example for a platform to the Arctic issues. Canada argued that they were ready to commit 
to a new high-level organ to protect the vulnerable Arctic. Canada raised the important 
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question of aboriginals and their livelihood, which should be ensured. Norway was 
concerned about tense juridical-issues which could cripple the nascent project for the 
Arctic. Denmark was ready for new, Arctic organ and regime without doubts if others 
were committing that as well. The Soviet Union reminded that the Arctic was still 
militarily and strategically active area, the time was right for a change and cooperation, 
at least within the sphere of environmental protection.281 
 
At the end of the Consultative Meeting, Minister Paasio was informed that the Meeting 
had a good atmosphere, and negotiations are ending with a decision of continuation; the 
next preparatory meeting was planned to be held in April 1990. The Ministerial 
Conference was dated to August-September 1990 in Finland. In the report draft, the 
proceedings of the meeting were described; two working groups were established. First 
one was for “a review of state of the environment in the Arctic and the need for further 
action”, and second for “consideration of existing international legal instruments for the 
protection of the Arctic environment and organisation of future co-operation.” These two 
working groups were decided to be politico-diplomatic, and groups were bound to report 
to all participants. The process was decided to lead to a Ministerial Conference, as 
Finland’s initiative suggested.282 
 
In October 1989, Gorbachev visited Finland. The main reason for the meeting was the 
signing of the Finno-Soviet cooperation in the Kola Peninsula, which was planned to be 
mainly economic and scientifical. However, for the mainstream, issue what came to 
prominence was the Soviet Union's official recognition of Finland's neutrality.283 
 
As a summary, one could say that Finland’s situation in international politics was in a 
great tailwind; Finland’s Arctic Initiative was a success even though the summer prior it 
had been exiting under the superpower pressure, Finland’s dreams to integrate more to 
the West was coming true, for example, via applying for the European Council, and the 
Soviet Union, at last, gave Finland recognition of neutrality. During the Consultative 
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Meeting, Finland was on the eyes of international press284, and the foreign participants 
spoke in the streets of Rovaniemi that meeting had “The Spirit of Rovaniemi”285. This 
recognition must have been a warming tribute after all work done to achieve all Arctic 
Eight countries around the same table to work together for the Arctic.
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5 Conclusion: Finland as a Balancing Consultant 
 
Heikkilä argued in 1988 that the areas in the Arctic region were the main stage during the 
Cold War. Furthermore, that if any change in tensions of Arctic was hoped in the eighties, 
the change was absolutely needed to begin from the Soviet Union because of the Arctic's 
crucial geographical meaning to the Soviets.286 Based on the data of this thesis, the change 
actually started to happen after the Soviet Union’s action through the Gorbachev’s speech. 
For the hypothesis where the Soviet Union’s glasnost made the cooperation with the 
Arctic issues easier, this is also a confirmation: the new Soviet, which was open and more 
willing to cooperate with West, might have been behind Gorbachev’s speech in 
Murmansk. Furthermore, based on the material of this thesis, it seems clear that 
Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk was a triggering point for Finland as well to start act 
as a head negotiator. The speech did not include any straight order or invitation, not even 
an indirect hint, for Finland to act as the leading convener, but still, Finland interpreted it 
like that. 
 
Consequently, the Murmansk Momentum was a watershed for Finland's acts on behalf of 
the Arctic cooperation; Finland realised as a first the momentum and started to create a 
cooperation organ by organising Finland's initiative. Thus, to the clarifying research 
question, if Finland’s line in Arctic issues changed after Gorbachev’s speech in 
Murmansk in October 1987, the answer is yes, it did change.  
 
The cooperation in the Arctic has usually being said to be Finland’s or Canadian’s 
proposal. In addition, the Gorbachev’s speech has said to be one of the crucial moments 
for further cooperation, but in the material of this thesis, there was no mention about 
“Russian initiative”, but many mentions about “Finland’s initiative” or “Canadian 
initiative”.  Initiative have sometimes been said to be Canadian, because Canada’s role 
was crucial after the year 1991 within the Arctic Council287. 
 
Despite the question which country was the first to propose further cooperation, the 
establishment of the cooperation in the Arctic region can be said to be started from the 
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academic level; for example, in Finland, the FIIA had been active before Finland’s 
politicians or state officials. The mid-eighties created the International Arctic Science 
Committee, and because the IASC was almost ready to establish, based on the data of this 
thesis, Finland needed to explain again and again, very carefully, the differences between 
Finland’s initiative and the IASC. Thus, Finland needed to make clear dividing principles 
from the IASC. During the first demonstrations of the initiative to other nations, Finland 
was repeatedly asked how Finland’s proposal differed from the IASC. The answer was, 
after all, quite easy: the IASC was concentrating on scientifical matters and was 
assembled of researchers and other seniors from different universities all overt he world, 
when Finland’s target, the International Conference on Arctic Environmental Protection, 
was political and had states officials, politicians, and other official representatives 
included. 
 
To the main research question, how was Finland performing Arctic diplomacy during the 
years 1986–1989, the concise answer would be that according to the data of this thesis, 
Finland’s acts were highly variable. More broadly, at first, Finland was an observer and 
responder during 1986. This does not mean that Finland was uninterested, vice versa, 
Finland actively followed Arctic issues. The second phase started in January 1987, when 
the MFA’s first memo about being an actor in the cooperation can be found. Even though 
the second phase started from an individual official, Jaakko Blomberg, who wrote his 
thoughts on Gorbachev’s speech to the memo, it was followed by an evident change: 
Finland's attitude towards the Arctic changed utterly. However, between the first memo 
and first actions, over half a year passed without reactions. If there have been 
consultations, discussions, or any other brainstorming after the Blomberg’s memo about 
Finland’s Arctic Initiative, the documents from the MFA’s documents do not reveal those. 
For some reason, however, Finland was grabbing the predominance, mainly by Blomberg 
and Rajakoski, in autumn 1988, and started active work to enable cooperation. This co-
hunting started the third and last phase in Arctic diplomacy during 1986–1989. In that 
period, Finland took the initiative, acted as a mediator and guide, and led the countries to 
a compromise that suited everyone. However, the compromise was not entirely what 
Finland was sought, but through mediation, it was possible to bring the initiative close to 
the desired goal. 
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During 1989 Finland was obviously in a hurry. As said before, in 1988, there was a long 
pause before Finland’s acts begun. After October 1988, however, Finland’s pace was 
breathless: two rounds of meetings with the other Arctic states, multiple sessions in 
Foreign Minister, and an endless amount of telegrams between countries. From the 
documents came visible that behind Finland, other Arctic countries negotiated about 
Finland’s initiative. These bilateral negotiations were, however, quite natural phenomena. 
The end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989 was full of meetings and journeys to Arctic 
Eight states, but during spring 1989, communication changed mostly to telegrams and 
letters. 
 
Finland’s hurry was also noticed in other Arctic countries; others did not react to the rush, 
but a few countries gave direct criticism. During summer 1989, reactions escalated, 
mainly from the US’s side. Even though the US might have had some other reasons in 
addition to the timetable for hesitating, it was true that Finland had given a short time for 
familiarising the documents. Especially considering the heavy machinery of superpowers, 
Finland’s aims were somewhat unrealistic. However, the documents revealed that Finland 
did realise that the momentum was just then, and the fear of losing the opportunity could 
have been veritable. The Cold War had had so many quick changes between tensions and 
détentes that the trust to the smooth continuation could have been fragile.  
 
Additionally, Finland did have anxiety about being in the Arctic states, this was a critical 
security issue, and that might be caused a situation where the hurry was seen as a must. 
The Finland’s intense must to integrate in 1989 might have affected to the rush in the 
Arctic cooperation. Finland’s foreign policy was in the heat of integration, the Cold War 
détente’s lasting was hard to foresee, and the Arctic’s security aspect was real for Finland 
– these all aspects might have created a Finland’s own momentum inside to the Murmansk 
momentum. 
 
Nevertheless, the rush had some impacts on the construction of the cooperation: for 
example, Finland did not answer to the US’s questions and this might been one reason 
for the US’s hesitating. Moreover, Finland informed its politicians and officials a little 
lightly; meeting notes from the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland reveal that not all officials followed events or the Finnish aspiration. There 
may not have been more time to communicate further. In addition, other urgencies in 
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Finland’s foreign policy should be taken into account: 1989 was a very eventful year in 
foreign policy. This could also have had an impact on Arctic cooperation and put pressure 
on it. 
 
However, when the US started to hesitate during spring 1989, Finland had tight times to 
conduct. One might even argue that was a turning point where Finland did not entirely 
lose, but at least fade, from the driver´s seat. The other seven Arctic countries wanted the 
US to join the cooperation, and at that point, the power shifted slightly from Finland to 
the US. The US had demands, and the other seven tried to handle the situation where the 
US started to dictate new conditions for the cooperation. But again, Finland followed its 
line and listened to the US, interpreted answers, and concluded a solution, which was 
suitable for other Arctic countries as well. Even though the US did not send high-
representatives to Rovaniemi, the US joined the final paper and, more importantly, to the 
cooperation process. End well, all well at the initiative of Finland, one could say. And 
even though if the process did not raise to the same level as the OSCE, the Rovaniemi 
consultative meeting had a lasting impact, which is still visible today in the actions of the 
Arctic Council. 
 
Sinevaara-Niskanen argued aptly in her doctoral thesis that who possesses the web of 
power and knowledge, which includes the social, economic, and environmental processes 
of the Arctic, also has the power to administer the develop in the Arctic area288. According 
to this thesis results, at one point, Finland was a spider weaving a net for the Arctic 
cooperation and had the power to administer. Based on the data of this thesis, Finland 
acted differently to different countries and had the talent to deal with different countries 
in ways that were appropriate to them. For example, Finland explained much more with 
details of the Initiative to the Soviet Union than to Nordic countries. Norway longed for 
a listener to their worries in the Arctic area, and Finland made time to listen. Finland had 
a tentative touch to the issue, made lots of consultations starting from lower levels 
processing higher-representatives. Thus, after the Gorbachev’s speech, Finland acted as 
the conductor.  
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However, the true power might have been totally somewhere else, in the hands of the 
state who had the actual launch for the cooperation: The Soviet Union. If power is defined 
as an ability to achieve the desired outcome through a relationship: as an ability to 
influence the behavior of others289, then the answer to the question, who has power should 
be sought from every nation’s desired outcome and from the influence to achieve that. 
This thesis has not used other Arctic eight countries archives, and therefore, the analysis 
is impossible to do to that extent. However, based on this thesis data, three true impactors 
rose above others: The Soviet Union, the US, and Finland. Besides, they all had a different 
part of the timeline in October 1987 – September 1989. Even though there had been 
openings for Arctic cooperation, for example, from Canada’s side, and the scientific 
cooperation had begun, the real launch was after Gorbachev’s speech. When taken 
account President Gorbachev’s unexceptional keen to take part and to join to Western 
cooperations and the fact that Soviet Union’s arctic ports were the target of NATO, the 
Soviet Union might have had a genuine aim to lead Arctic Countries to cooperation, 
Furthermore, due to the Gorbachev’s list of Arctic nations, one might argue that the Soviet 
Union defined which countries were Arctic and which were not — and taken these facts 
to account highlights that the first impactor was the Soviet Union. After the speech, 
Finland acted and took the conductor’s role. Finally, Finland’s initiative succeeded, but 
just before that, the US’s hesitating shifted the power momentarily to the US.   
 
Tennberg used Focault’s definition of power, where “power should be understood as a 
way to conduct“290.Relating to the second clarifying research question of this thesis, 
Focault’s definition popped up a question if Finland was using power in a Foucauldian 
way? Based on the material of this thesis, Finland made compromises and listened, and 
one might say Finland was even only a humble servant for the superpowers. But was 
Finland, instead of being a kind negotiator, actually having power? Canadian Science 
Advisor Fred Roots admitted in January 1989 that Finland had taken the leading role291. 
Young suggested that Finland was leading292.  The data of this thesis spoke a similar 
pattern, and therefore it could be said that Finland had the power to conduct, if not merely 
alone or all the time in the process, at least some parts of the process. 
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Young argued that Arctic cooperation occurred in a time where the whole world order 
was changing, and countries and even continents were searching for their place and allies 
in the world. Nordics needed a way to deal with changing the USSR, and in turn, it needed 
a way to deal with everyone. In this confusing world order, Finland wisely chose the right 
topics to drive, topics that even the superpowers could be working together. Finland 
removed difficult topics and concentrated only on the easier ones within the Arctic. 
Sustainable development was a real model concept at that time, and that one was able to 
sell for anyone in the Arctic.293 And as Tennberg aptly has argued in her doctoral thesis; 
global environmental problems affect even more harm than disadvantages for the 
environment; environmental problems are diplomatic problems, as well 294 . Finland 
wisely used this when was leading the Arctic Eight to cooperation. 
 
To the fair question, was Finland truly the Arctic key negotiator in the end of the Cold 
war, Young described well the role of Finland in the book Creating regimes: Arctic 
Accords and International Governance: 
“The Rovaniemi Declaration is often characterized as the Finnish Initiative 
due to the vigorous backing of Finland and, more specifically, senior 
officials in the Finnish Foreign Ministry coupled with the entrepreneurial 
activities of Esko Rajakoski, the Foreign Ministry official who spearheaded 
the drive to persuade others to join in creating this arrangement.”295 
 
Thus, Young’s answer is clear; the Rovaniemi Declaration and the Arctic diplomacy 
preceded this was Finland’s initiative. Furthermore, Young argued that Finland not only 
rose to be a driving force for negotiations after Gorbachev’s speech but did not let the 
subject go out when disinterest and antagonism popped up.296 However, one must bear in 
mind, that before or simultaneously with Finland’s acts, there were Canadian proposals 
and Gorbachev’s speech, which included an invitation to come and discuss the Arctic. 
Therefore, the road from the Rovaniemi Preparatory Meeting to the Arctic Council was 
not merely Finland’s achievement, but as this thesis shows, Finland had a significant role 
in it. Furthermore, Finland’s initiative cannot be said to be one man's work, but it is 
surprising how much Esko Rajakoski’s effort affected the project. This thesis is in line 
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with Young’s notice. He argued this well by saying that the Arctic cooperation started 
from Finland’s initiative, thanks to Rajakoski.297  
 
Moreover, the Rajakoski was not alone. Finland’s initiative begun after Blomberg’s 
memo in January 1988. From the documents of MFA’s, it remains unclear, if Finland’s 
active role was planned before Blomberg created the memo. However, Heininen argues 
that the Gorbatchev’s speech challenged Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Government to reflect on the new situation298. Similarly, Torstila argued in Kuhmo 
Summer Academy in 1988299. Nevertheless, retrospectively, when the data from the MFA 
is open, the Blomberg’s memo seems very relevant, even though Heininen and Torstila 
commented nothing about that. That is, as said, very natural because Blomberg's memo 
was classified top secret, and Heininen and Torstila did not have access to that when 
commented or wrote about the situation. 
 
What comes to limitations concerning especially this thesis, one must admit that when 
concentrating mainly on one particular theme of the foreign policy, it creates a skewed 
bubble, where everything is being viewed from just one perspective, in this case, from 
the Arctic perspective. This somewhat narrow-mindedness brings limitations to research 
work, and even though these constraints are recognised, those can still affect the narrative. 
 
Moreover, one must bear in mind that the data from this thesis is from Finland’s archives 
and totally from Finland’s point of view. Therefore the agency might be appearing more 
positive to Finland than it would be if taking other nation’s viewpoints, through their data, 
into account. In any case, Young had similar arguments. Tennberg had not any conclusion 
on the conductor due to the character of the research. She had concentrated reviewing the 
governmental structure and how power is present in the Arctic Council. Therefore, 
research on who actually had power in the Arctic initiative during the late 1980s from 
other countries documents in addition to only Finland’s documents might be a relevant 
issue for further investigation. 
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This thesis examined only the documents from MFA’s Archive’s “Arktiset alueet” files 
from 1986 onwards, but the “Arktiset alueet” data starts already from the year 1983. 
Naturally, Finland has had Arctic politics before 1983, but before that, there was no own 
file for that: Arctic issues are inside other MFA’s files. Therefore, it would be interesting 
to find out why Arctic files were established just in 1983. Furthermore, of course, the 
history of Finland’s Arctic politics is somewhat undone and would be a fascinating topic 
to research more widely. Moreover, due to Finland’s viewpoint and usage of Finland’s 
documents, the topic could be researched more comprehensively by taking other 
countries’ official documents from the Arctic issues into account. 
 
Retrospectively it is easy to say that the year 1989 and Finland’s act towards Arctic 
cooperation was significant, but at that time, it might have been a slight disappointment 
for Finland when they needed to lower level of the Preparatory Meeting and to submit to 
the fact that the timetable was tight and the ministerial conference for Arctic Act would 
require several preparatory meetings. However, that was precisely a field where Finland 
as an Arctic Ambassador was good: balancing between the superpowers like a bear 
whisperer. Eventually, two more meetings were needed but, after all, it all ended up to 
Finland’s dream: to Rovaniemi Conference in 1991, which made an official paper for 
further cooperation, the Rovaniemi Declaration, which in turn, led to the Arctic Council 
in 1996. This process was largely due to Finland’s strong Arctic policy during the 1986–
1989. 
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